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Iraqi Kurdistan in 2015 is polity quite unlike any other.  Iraqi Kurdistan has come to be treated in 
policy making circles as a model for what is sometimes believed to be impossible: a highly 
tribal, multi-religious and multi ethnic society in the Middle East with sentiments of unity, a 
burgeoning economy, the makings of a democracy, increasing literacy and quality of life, and 
(perhaps most impressively) an effective internal security arrangement in the middle of a chaotic 
region. Yet recent events have cast doubts on the future of Kurdistan.  The advance of the 
Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham (ISIS) during the summer of 2014 cast doubts upon the short-
term viability of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), and the successes of the Kurdish 
Peshmerga militia versus ISIS have at best forestalled the question of the Kurdish Region’s 
security vis-à-vis outside forces. While the future of the Kurdish Region will certainly be 
determined by a number of factors, this paper seeks to focus on the role of tribalism in particular, 
seeking to better understand the relationship between tribal structures and heritage, the KRG’s 
major political parties, and the KRG.  Ultimately, this paper argues that tribalism is alive and 
well in the Kurdish Region of Iraq.  Kurdish society, including the elements which are non-tribal, 
is heavily influenced by tribal mores and structures. This influence includes a tendency for 
different sectors of society to mobilize in opposition to each other to create a sort of balancing 
effect.  In the days of unrestricted tribal authority, this mobilization of support against another’s 
gains occurred through violent attacks, and this is still the case in much of the Middle East.  In 
the modern Kurdish state competition along these lines has been normalized into a peaceful 
political process.  The political parties of Iraqi Kurdistan are neo-tribal entities which follow this 
pattern of balanced opposition, but they are also full participants in a developing modern state’s 
institutions.  This way of incorporating tribalism presents a possible new way forward for other 





 Iraqi Kurdistan in 2015 is polity quite unlike any other.  The Kurds are famously a people 
without a homeland and a historically repressed minority, suffering the whims of Turkish, 
Iranian, and Iraqi state action during the tumultuous events of the Middle East in the 20th 
century.  This situation has not visibly changed; Kurds remain officially deprived of a nation 
state despite the emergence of a totally autonomous zone in northern Iraq.  At the same time, 
Iraqi Kurdistan has come to be treated in policy making circles as a model for what is sometimes 
believed to be impossible: a highly tribal, multi-religious and multi ethnic society in the Middle 
East with sentiments of unity, a burgeoning economy, the makings of a democracy, increasing 
literacy and quality of life, and (perhaps most impressively) an effective internal security 
arrangement in the middle of a chaotic region. Yet recent events have cast doubts on the future of 
Kurdistan.  The advance of the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham (ISIS1) during the summer of 
2014 cast doubts upon the short-term viability of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), and 
the successes of the Kurdish Peshmerga militia versus ISIS have at best forestalled the question 
of the Kurdish Region’s security vis-à-vis outside forces.  Some of the same qualities which have 
proved to be challenging for Iraq apply to the Kurdish Region as well; it is a multi-religious and 
multi-ethnic region, with a strong heritage in nomadic tribalism.   
While the future of the Kurdish Region will certainly be determined by a number of 
factors, this paper seeks to focus on the role of tribalism in particular.  The driving questions 
behind the research in this paper all pertain to the ways in which tribal social structures interact 
with the institutions of a modern state.  Can tribes survive as potent political forces in a modern 
state?  Do states with a tribal population have certain fundamentally tribal characteristics? Do 
                                                 




tribes constitute their own factions in the political scene?  How do tribes interact with political 
parties? Is a ‘tribal’ state inherently archaic in some respects or can it act as a ‘modern’ state? 
It is worth pausing for a moment here to note that I generally assume in this paper that the 
Kurdish Regional Government can be talked about as a state despite its current status as an 
autonomous region of Iraq.  Perhaps before the current war, it may have been possible to speak 
of the KRG as a component of Iraq, but that is no longer the case.  There are no more Iraqi forces 
patrolling the Kurdish Region.  The Kurdish Region has its own government which negotiates 
with other states independently of Baghdad.  It exports its own resources and has its own 
military.  It is reliant on Baghdad in name only.  In this paper its independent agency is not 
questioned, and it is assumed that theories of state-tribe interactions apply just as well to region-
tribe interactions. 
Chapter 1 of this paper discusses a number of theories about the role of tribalism in the 
state.  For some scholars, discussing tribes at all raises eyebrows.  While the theoretical portion 
of my analysis will touch on the debate over whether tribalism remains relevant, it must be said 
that the notion that tribes and tribalism have some importance in analyzing Kurdish society is 
another underlying assumption of this paper.  As will be reviewed in greater detail in chapter 2, 
very few Kurds can claim that tribalism is not in some way a part of their family’s recent 
heritage.  Tribalism is, at the very least, a source of certain mores of Kurdish society, and as I 
will later argue, probably plays a much more significant role as a source of key structural 
elements of Kurdish politics. 
Chapters 2 and 3 attempt to answer the questions raised by the theoretical discussion in 
Chapter 1.  Kurdish tribalism is quite different from the Arab tribalism which most scholars have 
studied, and as such a thorough review of the structure of Kurdish tribes is needed.  Chapter 2 
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begins with a review of the segmentary tribal structure in Kurdistan, but ultimately seeks to paint 
an image of modern Kurdish society as broadly following a somewhat tribal pattern.  In Chapter 
3, the political parties of Kurdistan specifically are examined, and I argue that these parties are 
the kin of the tribal confederations of old both structurally and in terms of behavior.   
Ultimately, this paper argues that tribalism is alive and well in the Kurdish Region of Iraq, 
which is also a modern state.  Kurdish society, including the elements which are non-tribal, is 
heavily influenced by tribal mores and structures. This influence includes a tendency for 
different sectors of society to mobilize in opposition to each other to create a sort of balancing 
effect.  In the days of unrestricted tribal authority, this mobilization of support against another’s 
gains occurred through violent attacks, and this is still the case in much of the Middle East.  In 
the modern Kurdish state competition along these lines has been normalized into a peaceful 
political process.  The political parties of Iraqi Kurdistan are neo-tribal entities which follow this 
pattern of balanced opposition, but they are also full participants in a developing modern state’s 
institutions.  While caution should be exercised regarding certain tendencies of tribal society, I 
argue that heavily tribal political factions in a state heavily influenced by tribalism can succeed 
in being ‘modern’ in the common sense of the word, and that this effective cooption of tribalism 
into a modern state presents a possible new way forward for other countries with similar 
problems.   
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Chapter 1: Theoretical Approaches 
One main challenge in developing an effective theoretical framework for dealing with 
Kurdish tribalism is the lack of scholarship on the topic.  While there was a brief surge in 
anthropological interest in Kurdistan during the first two decades of the twentieth century, 
interest in the Kurdish tribes in particular waned once the predecessor states of modern Turkey 
and Iraq had materialized and demonstrated themselves to be tenable shortly after the Second 
World War.  Much of the research from before this time comes from British military and 
intelligence officials.  While such material is an interesting primary source for constructing the 
tribes’ histories, it comes with the general lack of understanding that one might expect of an 
early-twentieth century colonial officer attempting to understand a foreign culture.2 What is 
available on the Kurdish tribes is a handful of anthropological studies and historical texts on the 
nature of Kurdish tribal society.  This material is useful in some ways, but lacks any meaningful 
analysis of the ways in which the social structure of the tribes affects national political issues. 
Another note that necessarily must be made regards the relevance of analyzing the social 
and political structures of nomadic tribes.  While most Kurdish tribes are no longer nomadic, the 
structures of the nomadic tribe have often persisted. Judith Yaphe, a former CIA analyst and 
Senior Research Fellow at the National Defense University in Washington, DC, describes how 
the values and structures of nomadic tribalism have persisted among the Arab tribes of Iraq well 
beyond the decline of the nomadic tribe as a prevalent social structure.  Yaphe explores the 
somewhat unexpected inclusion of tribal values and heritage in traditionally anti-tribal Iraqi 
Ba’athist doctrine and finds that beyond being a mere part of the Ba’ath image of Iraq, tribal 
structures and relationships pervaded even pre-Saddam state and party institutions. She also 
                                                 
2 A great example of this is Mark Sykes. "The Kurdish Tribes of the Ottoman Empire." The Journal of the Royal 




identifies the praising of tribal values such as loyalty, honor, and courage in Saddam’s Iraq.3  
According to Phoebe Marr’s History of Iraq, personal and family honor, factionalism, and 
intense individualism are just a few of the crucial tribal values which continue to influence Iraqi 
society.4  Chapter three will explore the extent of the role of the tribe in Iraqi and KRG political 
parties.  For now, however, it will suffice to say that the tribal heritages of both Kurdish and 
Arab Iraq are sufficiently significant to warrant analysis.  
This paper argues that a theoretical framework applicable to Kurdish tribes must be 
developed.  Given the lack of Kurd-specific theoretical political scholarship, I draw on analyses 
of Arab tribalism, with a focus on Iraq and Syria, since these analyses occasionally make cursory 
reference to the Kurds in each state.  The remainder of this chapter seeks to examine existing 
theories on the nature of tribalism as it pertains to the modern state and state institutions, and to 
analyze the merits of these theories.  I focus on the most prominent characterizations of Arab 
tribalism, and analyze their merits. The bulk of this analysis will take place later in the paper, in 
light of some context on the Kurdish tribes which will be provided in Chapter 2, and analysis of 
the Kurdish region’s political parties in Chapter 3.    The nature of my criticism of the authors 
discussed in this chapter is often not a criticism of their arguments in their own right, but rather a 
criticism of their theories’ validity with regards to the Kurdish Region.   
Ultimately, the perspective utilized in this paper has three main tenets which represent a 
fusion of the ideas which will be presented in this chapter.  Firstly, tribalism is an important 
force in the modern Kurdish polity due to the state’s tribal heritage and the tribal or neo-tribal 
entities which make up the Kurdish region’s political factions.  Secondly, the segmentary nature 
                                                 
3 Judith Yaphe. "Tribalism in Iraq, the Old and the New." Middle East Policy 7, no. 3 (2000): 51-58. Accessed 
February 8, 2015. doi:10.1111/j.1475-4967.2000.tb00162. Digital copy does not have page numbers, so numbers of 
printing of that copy were used. 
4 Phebe Marr. The Modern History of Iraq. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1985, P. 19. 
Kennedy 8 
 
of tribal societies provides a mechanism similar to Salzburg’s “balanced opposition,” in which 
segments of society tend to mobilize versus groups of a similar size as long as such segments of 
society exist.  Thirdly, both state and tribe significantly affect each other when the two coexist in 
a political community: the state adopts some of tribalism’s structures and mores, and the tribe 
becomes more compliant with state authority when it exists within a stable state. 
 
Debates on the Character of Tribalism 
 The overarching problem with attempting to analyze tribalism was identified correctly by 
Syrian scholar Haian Dukhan in his crucial article, “Tribes and Tribalism in the Syrian 
Uprising”: despite great interest in tribalism’s influence and character, a consensus has not been 
reached on the definition of a tribe.5  Dukhan proposes as a tentative definition, “a localized 
group in which kinship is the dominant idiom of organization, and whose members consider 
themselves culturally distinct in terms of customs, dialect or language, and origins.”6  This 
inclusion of cultural identity separates him notably from other scholars.  The earliest definition 
of a tribe comes from the 13th century Arab sociologist Ibn Khaldoun, who argued that tribes are 
segmentary entities that naturally emerge as a way of satisfying the fundamental needs for 
defense and socialization.7  More modern authors have opted for more specific definitions and 
analyses.  English anthropologist E.E. Evans-Pritchard argued that tribes are segmentary entities 
which originate out of feelings of solidarity, and which make conflict play out along predictable 
                                                 
5 Haiah Dukhan. "Tribes and Tribalism in the Syrian Uprising." Syria Studies 6, no. 2 (2014): P. 1. 
6 Dukhan, “Tribes…Syrian Uprising” P. 3. 
7 This is an extremely simplified version of Ibn Khaldoun’s extensive analysis of the role of the tribe found in Ibn 
Khaldoun,. The Muqaddimah. Translated by Franz Rosenthal. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967.  The use 




lines by providing social entities of similar sizes to respond to one another.8 Dutch 
anthropologist Martin van Bruinessen seems to hesitate at using the word ‘tribe’ with a clear 
assumed definition at all, pointing out that the Kurds he analyzes do not have a widely 
understood translation of that word; they use a number of words which refer to differing sizes of 
social orders depending on region and dialect.  Throughout his analysis, he seems to refer to any 
group acting independently under the authority of a tribal leader to be a tribe, except very large 
amalgamations based on mobilized alliances for military purposes. He and most others refer to 
these as coalitions.9 
Another subject of great disagreement is the way that tribes interact with political 
institutions, including both governmental entities and political parties.  Ibn Khaldoun argues that 
tribes interact with states in an inverse power relationship; strong states can subjugate and 
incorporate tribes, but weak states are especially vulnerable to revolution at the hands of the 
tribes they have subjugated.10  Contemporary scholars disagree whether tribes are a dying or 
resurgent force in the modern Middle East.  Reidar Visser, Senior Research Fellow at the 
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, makes the case that tribes have essentially been 
reduced to social identities, overlapped by stronger cultural and political identities.11 Dukhan and 
others, however, argue that very recent events herald the re-emergence of tribalism in weak 
Middle Eastern states.12   
Scholarship on the interactions between tribes and political parties is regrettably lacking.  
In the early history of the modern states of Iraq and Syria, this relationship was clearer; political 
                                                 
8 E.E. Evans-Pritchard. The Nuer, a Description of the Modes of Livelihood and Political Institutions of a Nilotic 
People. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1940. Cited in Dukhan, “Tribes…Syrian Uprising”. 
9 Martin Van Bruinessen. Agha, Shaikh, and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan. London: Zed 
Books, 1992. 
10 Dukhan, “Tribes…Syrian Uprising” P. 3. 
11 Reidar Visser. "Opinion: Tribalism in Iraq: Resurgent Force or Anachronism in the Modern State?" Contemporary 
Arab Affairs 3, no. 4 (2010): 495-502. doi:10.1080/17550912.2010.519162. 
12 Dukhan, “Tribes…Syrian Uprising” 
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parties were modern institutions which directly competed with tribes for power and influence.  In 
the parliament of the early Syrian republic, constitutional debates often revolved around the role 
that Bedouin tribes should have.13  The Syrian Ba’athists have maintained their rhetorical 
opposition to tribalism and sectarianism, but Bashar Al-Assad has pointedly engaged tribes in 
maintaining his power and in suppressing, among other movements, Kurdish independence 
efforts.14  The Iraqi government under Saddam Hussein, on the other hand, dropped both its 
practical and rhetorical opposition in favor of incorporating tribal structures and values.15  In 
modern Jordan, the oppositional paradigm seems to hold sway.  The monarchy has relied on 
tribes’ desire for individual representation to suppress the potential of party lists to form a 
coherent opposition.  The tactic works; the Jordanian parliament is more a showcase of tribal 
leaders’ influence than a place for the making of policy, and the sheer number of tribal 
representatives prevents the election of a majority party.  Scholars, including Temple University 
political scientist Sean Yom, have accurately levied the charge against the regime that the 
facilitation of this process has been intentional; the Single Non-Transferrable Vote, for example, 
forces voters to choose between supporting their tribal representative and supporting a party.16 
Accusations of tribal behavior continuously fly between Kurdish political parties, despite both 
major groups’ historic reliance on tribal organization.   Clearly there are multiple ways to 
interpret this interaction.  
 
 
                                                 
13 Dukhan, “Tribes…Syrian Uprising” P. 7-9. 
14 Dukhan, “Tribes…Syrian Uprising” P. 8. 
15 Amatzia Baram. "Neo-Tribalism in Iraq: Saddam Hussein's Tribal Policies 1991–96." International Journal of 
Middle East Studies 29, no. 01 (1997): 1-31. Accessed February 5, 2015. doi:10.1017/S0020743800064138, P. 15. 




The Tribe as Supportive to the State 
 A compelling argument for the value of tribes to the state is the number of ways in which 
tribal values and structures can be recruited into state service.  Judith Yaphe, among others, 
argues that the Iraqi Ba’ath party succeeded at incorporating tribal values into their narrative of 
the Iraqi state and that tribal structures became an important part of the Iraqi government’s 
maintenance of order.   The resulting Iraqi state was heavily influenced, at times to the point of 
being threatened, by its tribes.  But Saddam’s Iraq did manage to survive despite (or because of) 
its tribal policy until it was faced with U.S. intervention, and thus is worth examining.  It is 
necessary to examine both the incorporation of tribal structures into the state, and the adoption 
by state institutions of structures inspired by tribalism.  Yaphe’s initial description of the nature 
of tribalism sounds inherently problematic for the modern state.  Until settlement, she argues that 
tribes essentially function as mobile mini-states which behave autonomously and whose 
members primarily acknowledge only tribal, not state, authority.  When placed within the context 
of a state, however, these tribes change.  It is true that tribes maintain certain loyalties and values 
which may contradict the state’s values and the role of the shaikh as mediator-in-chief for 
personal disputes.  Yet despite the maintenance of such tribal structures, forced settlement leads 
to the elimination of other crucial aspects of the tribe.  The loss of mobility removes a great deal 
of the tribe’s autonomy, and the value system of the tribe can be augmented to embrace the 
concept of state authority.  The shaikh may remain the mediator of personal matters, but criminal 
and religious mediation is outsourced to state authorities.17 
  Iraqi sociologist Faleh Abu Jabar argues that three types of tribe subordinate to their state 
can be observed, two of which are far easier for the state to manage.  In “statist tribes,” tribal 
allegiance is obtained by incorporating tribal values into the state’s definition.   As described, 
                                                 
17 This is a summary of an argument made throughout Yaphe, “Tribalism…”  
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Hussein’s Iraq did this with some success.  In “social tribes,” the state has granted the tribes 
some degree of authority, both through judicial and tax rights.  Yaphe says that Saddam’s later 
tribal policy fits this category.  The closest type of tribe to an old-fashioned tribal order is the 
“military-ideological” tribe.  Rather than participating in the state, this type of tribe 
independently mobilizes along tribal lines to confront an external threat, which can well be the 
state itself.  Yaphe says that Iraq’s Kurds and Shi’a mobilized along these lines in the 1990s.  
Alternately, the state can incorporate these tribes into the state security apparatus through the 
risky mechanism of arming and employing them as a group, as Baghdad did with mixed success 
in Kurdish areas during the second half of the twentieth century.18   
 Regardless of the type of tribe at play, the state must somehow buy the tribe’s 
participation in the system in order for the tribe to strengthen the state.  In Iraq this was 
accomplished in two main ways.  Beginning with Hussein’s ascendency, clan and family 
members and networks were directly recruited by the military and security services.  This 
privileged certain tribal groups with status and control of coercive power.  Saddam heavily 
preferred his own clan, the Bayjat, for service in positions of power and those military units 
responsible for his safety.19 But the remainder of the elites in the ostensibly anti-tribal Ba’ath 
party came from small Bedouin villages where tribal mores still held sway. Officers were 
recruited from tribal backgrounds and promoted more quickly than those from the Ba’ath party’s 
traditional urban base.20 This incorporation was not without its risk to Saddam, who was targeted 
by members of his own security services due to tribal tensions more than once.  Still, tribal 
origins provided the regime with a limited guarantee of an individual’s commitment to certain 
                                                 
18 Faleh Abu Jabar, "The Reconstruction and Deconstruction of Iraq's Tribes: Tribalism under Patrimonial 
Totalitarianism, 1968-1998," unpublished paper, October 14, 1999. 
19 Yaphe, “Tribalism…”. P. 4. 
20 Baram, “Neo-Tribalism…” P. 5. 
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traditional mores and hints toward his political affiliation. The tribes, in turn, were provided with 
an excellent vehicle for upward social mobility.21  This approach was applied extensively during 
Baghdad’s numerous conflicts with Iraqi Kurds; the recruitment of Kurds as jash paramilitary 
units was commonplace. 
 The second way that Saddam bought tribes’ loyalty was through material rewards.  Tribes 
which demonstrated loyalty and heavily contributed to the party and security services were 
rewarded by the regime with infrastructure improvements. One Shaikh relayed to The 
Independent that Saddam’s tribal policy explicitly rewarded support with the extension of roads, 
electricity, and water systems to loyal villages.22  
Finally, tribes were brought on board with the regime by making the state’s image of the 
Iraqi state highly appealing to tribal mores and reaching out to tribal leadership. Hussein’s 
carefully crafted personal image is the most visible element of this.  Hussein took every 
opportunity in public to remind Iraqis of his small town heritage.  He was born in a small village 
outside of Tikrit, where traditional tribal conservatism held sway.   His stepfather refused to send 
him to school, instead preferring to raise him by a value code which emphasized Islam, 
patriarchy, and ancient tribal honor codes of honor and justice.23 Every part of this except for his 
questionable paternal origins was included in press statements and his comments in public.  
Despite the original stance of the Iraqi Ba’ath as diametrically opposed to the values of tribal 
society (which were seen by the Ba’ath as a holdover of colonial domination), Saddam embraced 
his tribal image.  Overtures from tribal leaders were phrased in terms of fealty and received in 
ceremonies riddled with the symbolism of tribal deference to the Shaikh.  State media portrayed 
                                                 
21 Baram, “Neo-Tribalism…” P. 6. 
22 Al-Jubburi, Shaikh Mish'an. Interview by Helga Graham. The Independent, August 20, 1995. Cited in Baram, 
“Neo-Tribalism…” p. 5. 
23 Yaphe, “Tribalism…”. P. 4. 
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him as embodying manly valor, military prowess, courage, and honor.24 While to the urban 
Ba’ath he may have been “his Excellency President Saddam Hussein the Commander of the 
Armed Revolution,”25 to tribal leaders, he was Shaikh Mashaikh, the chief of chieftains.26 
These three strategies enabled the state to receive the tribes’ support without ceding 
significant power to them.  Through the 1980s, state institutions aiming to replace traditional 
forms of welfare, security, education, and civil society caused a slow decline in tribal influence 
and traditional social structures generally.  State organs became increasingly involved in both 
Sunni and Shi’a Islam until both were largely controlled.  After the early 1980s, however, the 
state found itself embroiled in a costly war with Iran and crippled by sanctions.  The loss of oil 
revenue and the increase in military expenses caused the state to curtail its vast social and 
security services.  By the end of the war with Kuwait, Iraq’s middle class was shrinking.  Tribal 
structures naturally began to fill the void in status and influence left by this contraction and the 
decline of government services.27  The government in Baghdad facilitated this growth, 
encouraging the reconstruction of tribal structures in both urban and rural populations.  In 
regions where tribal structures no longer existed, the government granted artificial lead-family 
status to non-tribal families.  These new and propped up tribes were, by all accounts, very loyal 
to Hussein’s government.28  Tribes participated in what Yaphe calls a symbiosis wherein they 
publicly supported the regime in exchange for their status and power.29  At the same time, all 
tribes were expected to behave differently than would have been traditionally expected; their 
                                                 
24 Baram. "Neo-Tribalism…” P. 15. 
25 Culture and Information Bureau, The Arab Baath Socialist Party. "A Call to the Heroic Tribes in Southern Iraq." 
Al-Moharer. September 7, 2006. Accessed April 15, 2015. http://www.al-
moharer.net/qiwa_shabiya/baath2006/baath7-9-06e.htm. 
26 Yaphe, “Tribalism…”. P. 5. 
27 Yaphe, “Tribalism…”. P. 6. 
28 Baram, “Neo-Tribalism…” P. 7, 11. 
29 Yaphe, “Tribalism…”. P. 7. 
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authority was decidedly subject to state law, and retribution against other tribal groups for crimes 
was prohibited as long as the person could be prosecuted.30 
The incorporation of tribal values into the state was far more than a political farce by the 
1990s; Israeli historian Amatzia Baram provides several examples where the Iraqi government 
acted far more in accordance with tribal customs than with Ba’ath party doctrine.  One of the 
earliest signs of this change was Saddam’s embracing of the role of chief national holy man.  In 
1991, he interpreted Quranic text controversially in a public speech, explaining that the prophet 
had been chosen by God prior to his birth.  He concluded, incredibly, with the assertion that, “no 
one should be allowed…leadership in the Ba’ath party if [he does not] come from a 
good…family background.”31  At a party congress in 1992, Saddam invoked the Prophet in 
justifying his promotion of tribal leaders to state offices.32  In several criminal cases, the 
government allowed a shaikh’s arbitration to resolve disputes of national importance such as 
corruption. When two members of Hussein’s family defected to Jordan, their father declared 
them family outcasts and declared that anyone could spill their blood.  The defectors returned to 
Iraq and were killed along with several members of their families by their own clan.  A state 
official then cleared the attackers’ name, praised two attackers who had been killed as martyrs, 
and publicly compared their action to cutting off an ailing finger.  On numerous other occasions, 
national actions, including the invasion of Kuwait, were justified in terms of tribal honor.33 
 
 
                                                 
30 Baram, “Neo-Tribalism…” P. 7, 12. 
31 Al-Jumhuriyya, 21 September 1991, in FBIS-NES, 26 September 1991, 21-23. Cited in Baram, “Neo-
Tribalism…” P. 13. 
32 Saddam Hussein. "Speech to the Ba'ath Regional Congress." Speech, 1992 Ba'ath Regional Congress, Baghdad, 
October 7, 1992. Cited in Baram, “Neo-Tribalism…” p. 13.  
33 Baram, “Neo-Tribalism…” P. 14. 
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The Tribe as Decentralized and Poisonous to the Modern State 
 The case that tribal structures and values are fundamentally opposed to the modern state 
is probably more widely held and stated, but certainly less developed from a scholarly 
perspective than its antithesis.  The unfortunate situation of current scholarship on the topic is 
that many scholars who have contributed to this perspective are clearly motivated by a desire to 
demonize Islam.  The effort to separate authors’ arguments from their motivation requires that I 
use some such sources here.  There is a case to be made that some of the arguments made are 
legitimate; as it will be seen, there is much about segmentary tribalism which is cause for alarm 
regarding such institutions’ ability to participate in a modern state.  Given the previous 
arguments which demonstrate the tendency of states to incorporate some aspects of tribalism, 
this is also cause for alarm regarding the likely conduct of those states.  As such, this section 
engages seriously McGill University anthropologist Philip Carl Salzman’s argument on the 
nature of “balanced opposition” and responds to his application of that argument to the Islamic 
umma as a sort of mega-tribe. 
 Salzman explores the role of the segmentary tribe in providing Middle Eastern societies 
with what he calls “balanced opposition.”  Because tribes are organized into nested kin groups, 
any attack on an individual by a group theoretically produces a response by a group of a similar 
size.  So one’s family defends against an attack by another family, one’s clan against another 
clan, and one’s tribe against another tribe.  The responses in question most explicitly are required 
of one’s kin group when an individual is physically attacked, but tribal mores require some sort 
of response to political and personal attacks as well. Within the context of nomadic or settled 
tribal entities interacting, this is certainly the case.  Salzman argues that this applies to larger and 
theoretically non-tribal groups as well.  According to him, Egyptians come to the aid of other 
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Egyptians, Sunnis to the aid of other Sunnis, and, “the Islamic community faces the infidels.”34  
Salzman argues that this tribal type of organization was intrinsically linked to the spread of Islam 
such that the mores associated with balanced opposition have found their way into fundamental 
understandings of Islam and states operating within Islam.35   
 The first accusation that Salzman levies at tribal structures is that predatory expansion is 
necessary for tribal structures because the tribe must increase its population and livestock in 
order to maintain its position.  Thus the tribe must practice aggressive expansion.  Additionally, 
young men see combat as an opportunity to gain honor, which Salzman identifies as crucial to 
these tribal societies.  Salzman does not explicitly say that the remnants of tribal structures are 
more prone to violence than non-tribal populations, but he does say that within the tribe, the 
vanquishing of another in predatory conquest is a path to being celebrated.  He establishes that 
Middle Eastern tribal culture values victory and detests the vanquished, and then goes on to say 
that this mentality facilitates the ability of Middle Easterners generally (not just tribal 
populations) to control subservient groups of people and resources, suggesting that modern 
authoritarian states rely just as much on the notion that the victor should be rewarded as tribes 
did. He argues that as Islam expanded, a tribal mentality on raiding became the norm for the 
violent spread of Islam.  “Bedouin raiding became sanctified as an act of religious duty.” 36  Most 
controversially, he argues that the tribal tendency to value closeness in degrees enabled raiders in 
the early days of the Caliphate to treat those who were both ethnically and religiously different 
from them with tremendous cruelty.  He identifies sources which correctly depict some portions 
                                                 
34 Philip C. Salzman "The Middle East's Tribal DNA." Middle East Quarterly 15, no. 1 (Winter 2008): 23. 
Academic OneFile. Digital copy does not have page numbers, so numbers of printing of that copy were used. 
35 Salzman, “The Middle East’s Tribal DNA” P. 3. 
36 Salzman, “The Middle East’s Tribal DNA” P. 3. 
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of the Islamic conquest as brutal, and anecdotes of Arab Muslim leaders reneging on agreements 
and argues that the tribal mentality enabled such behavior.37 
 More fundamentally, Salzman makes the case that the concept of balanced opposition, 
which he says is inherent in Muslim culture, prevents systems of government from taking hold 
which are based on a concept of universal morality.  According to him, Islam is inherently 
relative and contingent; Muslims act politically as Muslims only when in opposition to non-
Muslims.  In a belief system where a notion of “my group versus the other” is more important 
than deference to a moral system, he argues that a universalistic and inclusive constitution is not 
possible.38  Furthermore, he argues that the tribal heritage prevents a true seeking of common 
interests, instead encouraging Arabs to unite versus non-Arabs and Muslims versus non-
Muslims.39   
 A cursory look at the historical record will indicate that Salzman’s argument on Arabs’ 
and Muslims’ fundamental tendency to support each other against outsiders is deeply flawed.  
Contained within this argument, however, is a theoretical argument about the way that tribal 
structures should be expected to respond to opposition or attack.  Salzman treats the tribal 
segment as more or less absolute.  In his view, the importance of honor in the Middle Eastern 
tribal culture ensures that individuals will always fulfill their tribal obligations.  As such, 
individuals can always count on their family versus another family, clan versus another clan, and 
so forth.  As the famous Arab saying quoted by Salzman and others goes, “Me against my 
brother, my brother and I against my cousin, my cousin, brother, and I against the rest of the 
world.”40  
                                                 
37 Salzman, “The Middle East’s Tribal DNA” P. 4. 
38 Salzman, “The Middle East’s Tribal DNA” P. 6. 
39 Salzman, “The Middle East’s Tribal DNA” P. 10. 
40 Omar Rifai. Comments to CIEE Arab Diplomacy Class. Amman, Jordan. Spring 2014. 
Kennedy 19 
 
 The glaring problem with this theory as a model for analyzing the Kurds is that Kurdish 
history is riddled with examples of Kurds acting against other Kurds.  While the majority of 
these examples are from before the development of a solid Kurdish identity and therefore 
invalid, many more recent examples involve formerly outspoken nationalists who were swayed 
by a combined carrot and stick.  Kurdish tribes recruited by Saddam to fight for him in his efforts 
to suppress Kurdish agitators clearly did so not out of a feeling of segmentary loyalty, but out of 
a rational pursuit of their own interests. 41 Even within traditional, nomadic, pastoral tribes, it was 
commonplace for aspiring tribal leaders to reach across, up, or down the tribal hierarchy in 
search of support for their effort to rise to power/predominance.  Yet even more examples can be 
found where Kurdish tribes mobilized precisely along tribal lines in conflicts with outsiders.  The 
more recent history of the relations between Kurdish political parties actually provides support 
for both of Salzman’s arguments; the major parties in Iraqi Kurdistan found it nearly impossible 
to cooperate until faced with a true existential threat in the form of the Anfal campaigns and the 
accompanying genocide. 
Salzman also argues that tribes operate fundamentally differently from states: the former 
arebased on decentralization and self-help, and the latter are efined by their centralized political 
hierarchies with specialized institutions to maintain social control and defense.42  This differs 
from Yaphe’s view that tribes left to their own devices essentially function as mobile mini-states.  
As will be demonstrated in chapter two, the realities of the power structure in Kurdish tribes 
actually lead to an endorsement of Salzman’s view.  Kurdish tribes rarely mobilize as a whole 
tribe or tribal coalition except in response to threats of a similar size.  The tribal Agha or Shaikh 
does not handle small judicial matters unless the matter is between major segments of the tribe.  
                                                 
41 For a stunningly large number of such examples, see Book IV of McDowall, David. A Modern History of the 
Kurds. London: I.B. Tauris, 1996. 
42 Salzman, “The Middle East’s…” P. 1-2. 
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Arbitration and the maintaining of tribal authority and cohesion are both highly decentralized 
processes, happening at the lowest possible level.   
Salzman’s argument that Middle Eastern states have internalized tribal values focused on 
aggression against outsiders can be treated as dubious at best.  But in a state like 1990s Iraq, 
where judicial and security authority was delegated to the tribes, these structures would naturally 
have functioned in a way that handled disputes at the lowest level.  The product of this process of 
repeated delegation would seem to be the placing of large amounts of authority not just in the 
hands of tribal governors, but in the hands of unknown patriarchs at various levels of the tribal 
system, right down to the level of the family.  Thus the organizing principle of the judicial and 
security systems should be expected to be in line with tribal mores. 
 
Tribalism as an Overstated Force 
 In seeking to analyze tribal structures and actions, some scholars have been accused of 
overstating or fetishizing tribalism as an exciting portrayal of an exotic culture.   Reidar Visser, a 
research fellow at the Norweigan Institute of International Affairs, made the case in 2010 that 
much of the analysis of Iraq’s tribal politics has been subject to this sort of misguided analysis.  
He argues that while tribes may be a potent form of social organization, they are ultimately less 
influential in politics than western scholars of the topic are likely to believe. Tribes, according to 
this argument, are just one of many competing identities for an individual in a Middle Eastern 
society just as geographical origins are but one component of a person’s identity in the United 
States. 
 One manifestation of what Visser sees as a misguided attempt to analyze tribalism is the 
proliferation during the Iraq war of “tribal maps” and their use in policy decisions.    Visser 
Kennedy 21 
 
viewed a number of prominent maps and found that not one wasreally accurate.  They often 
misplaced tribes or misrepresent their significance.  Much of the information used to construct 
them appears to have originated from British military records from the 1910s and 1920s, which 
is largely out of date as a result of the traumatic events in Iraq during the last century.  The maps 
produced by the CIA and used prominently in U.S. decision making circles were among the most 
woefully outdated.43  The tribe of Iraqi President Nuri Al-Maliki, which Visser’s study focuses 
on, is consistently shown as more prominent and more southern on these maps than they actually 
are.44 
 Publications by U.S. administrators in Iraq also used tribal labels incorrectly, and these 
mistakes tend to overstate the role of a tribe rather than understate it.  Visser cites examples from 
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) press releases, where individuals were referred to as 
leaders of tribes when they were not, or where the size of a tribe was vastly overstated.  One tribe 
in particular was referred to as having 750,000 members, which as Visser points out, would 
mean that the tribe made up 3% of all Iraqis.45  Individuals’ credentials for being appointed to a 
position included statements of tribal roles which are in reality little more than ceremonial titles. 
Similarly, American media often made tribal connections between unrelated individuals on the 
basis of their last names, or made matter-of-fact statements about tribal loyalties based on such 
individuals’ names, despite their vastly different political affiliations.46   
 U.S.-led coalition efforts to engage the tribes have been made based on flawed or 
incorrect views of tribal boundaries and affiliations.  In several cases, rural areas within the zone 
of influence of a tribe were incorrectly engaged on the assumption that the nearby tribe had more 
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44 Visser, “Opinion…” P. 497. 
45 Visser, “Opinion…” P. 496. 
46 Visser, “Opinion…” P. 497. 
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influence over these areas than they actually did.  Prime Minister Maliki’s efforts to build a 
coalition for himself in the southern part of Iraq focused heavily on winning over tribes based on 
his own tribe’s ancient loyalties, some of which were no longer seen as valid.47 
 In southern Iraq, Visser argues, tribes may not really exist in the traditional sense of the 
word. If one defines tribes, as Visser does, as “a community of armed men connected by agnatic 
kinship ties, whether real or imagined,” this is true. However, tribes in the Arab portions of Iraq 
mostly recognize that their political tribal alliances are not based on kinship ties, and track those 
two types of allegiance separately.  As will be shown later, this differs significantly from the 
situation in the rural parts of Kurdistan, where political allegiance is still often characterized in 
terms of imagined kinship.  It should also be noted that Visser’s definition of the tribe used in 
making this assertion describes only one of the types of tribe identified by Faleh Abu Jabar, as 
discussed earlier in this chapter: the military ideological tribe.  The other types of tribes still have 
quite a bit of life left in them as can be seen by the application of Hussein’s tribal policy to those 
areas.  The fact that tribes no longer function exactly as they once did is a given in almost all 
modern states; as other authors have shown, this does not mean that tribes do not still act in a 
tribal way.   
 One convincing argument made by Visser involves the decline of the Malik tribe’s 
political unity.  Their disintegration began under pressure from the Ottoman government, but 
really accelerated with the British arrival in 1914.  Several prominent members of the Malik tribe 
found themselves at odds with the British, and the British thus sought to force the already-
developing separation of the tribe from its southern allies through migration.  Later 
improvements in their relationship with the British allowed this process to stop, but the British 
made sure that the various parts of the Malik tribe were under the influence of competing 
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paramount tribes in their regions.  A comparison of the early British reports regarding the tribe 
and the reality of the tribe’s power by the 1920s shows that the tribe was no longer a significant 
political player.48  Visser argues that this process of disintegration can be seen in many tribes, 
and that it happens, “as a result of manipulation by their enemies.”49  This does not appear to be 
incorrect, but it should be noted that the enemy in question is generally not a foreign power or a 
tribal enemy, but the government of the state itself.   
 A better example of tribal irrelevance in modern Iraqi politics was the recent disinterest 
of the Malik tribe in supporting the government of Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki.  Whereas 
Saddam was able to draw his most reliable support from his tribe, Al-Maliki was pointedly 
opposed by the nominal head of his tribe, Sabri bin Badr al-Rumayyid.  In 2008, 123 tribal 
leaders from the Malik tribal coalition signed a petition decrying the Islamic Supreme Council of 
Iraq (ISCI), an ally of Al-Maliki.  The same relative who spearheaded that effort later criticized 
Al-Maliki’s tribal policies in the south directly.50  Some of this divide was the result of the 
British policy of separating the powerful tribe from its allies, but that excuse cannot be made for 
Al-Maliki’s own branch of the tribe.  A close relative of his, Fadil Al-Maliki has been an ardent 
critic of the Iraqi constitution, and a number of Al-Maliki’s theoretically close tribal allies were 
released from the government for ties to the Ba’ath party.51   
 The easiest criticism of Visser’s example is that many tribes have not been so 
successfully divided.  In Iraqi Kurdistan, the Ottoman, British, and Iraqi governments have all 
had less success at suppressing and fragmenting tribes as a result of the mountains’ 
inaccessibility.  While Al-Maliki’s tribal alliances may have been shaky, chapter three will 
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demonstrate that others, such as Massoud Barzani have strongly benefitted from their tribal ties.  
Since Visser’s thesis is that tribes break down under outside pressure, his theory wouldn’t apply 
to tribes that have not been so directly subjected to this pressure.  His argument is likely to be of 
use, however, in analyzing the PUK-dominated parts of the Kurdish Region, which suffered the 
most under Saddam Hussein and in which tribes are thought to have the least sway.  The primary 
value in Visser’s thesis is that it demonstrates that tribes which are theoretically intact may not 
act with the same degree of political unity that one might expect them to.   
 
Concluding Questions 
 This review of the scholarship and theoretical perspectives of tribalism predictably 
prompts more questions than answers.  Vastly different ways of viewing the nature of tribalism 
lead, naturally, to vastly different views of the future of tribal systems and their influence.  
Specifically, the scholars reviewed here seem to differ in their answers to two questions which 
are crucial to any kind of predictive research on Kurdistan.  Firstly, is tribalism a force which is 
persisting, declining, or spreading in general and in Iraqi Kurdistan in particular?  Secondly, is 
the likely relationship between tribes and the burgeoning Kurdish government in Iraq one of 
cooperation or antagonism?  Finally, if the institutions of the KRG and Iraqi Kurdish society are 
going to absorb some fundamentally tribal character, what should we expect the nature of that 
government and those institutions to be as a result? 
 If the arguments of Ibn Khaldoun and Haian Dukhan are to be believed, then the question 
of tribalism’s ascendancy or decline would be strongly tied to the question of whether state (or 
quasi-state) institutions in the Kurdish region are strengthening or declining.  Looking at the 
weak Iraqi state as the state which the Kurdish tribes exist within would lead to an expectation 
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that dormant or lessened tribal structures could be expected to be resurgent, as Dukhan says the 
Arab tribes in both Syria and Iraq are.  The peculiar situation of the Kurdish Regional 
Government, however, merits some hesitation on this assumption.  While the Iraqi state has 
undoubtedly gotten weaker recently, there is a strong case to be made that the Kurdish region 
must be treated in this type of analysis as its own state entity, as the most relevant political 
entities for Kurdish tribes are in Erbil, not Baghdad.  This obviously is not the case for the 
significant Kurdish populations living outside of the KRG’s areas of control in Iraq, nor for the 
Kurdish groups in northeastern Syria, where the national borders with Iraq are currently so 
porous that ignoring those tribes as non-Iraqi seems somewhat pointless. Despite the KRG’s 
current strength, the fundamentals of tribalism remain present in government and parties as well 
as the tribes themselves. 
In order to understand the continued strength of tribes and relevance of tribalism within 
Kurdistan at a time when the KRG is also strong, it is necessary to understand how tribes interact 
with the KRG.  The understandings of Yaphe and Baram would suggest that the tribal and state 
structures of the Kurdish region would each continue to be affected by the interaction, and that 
the result would be a state with some tribal values and characteristics and tribes which have 
changed to operate within the state’s authority.  Visser, despite his significant disagreements 
with the character of tribal influence, would seem to agree at least that the KRG, having been 
formed by people with tribal experience, would in some ways be fundamentally tribal.  Based on 
his willingness to apply this argument to all sorts of institutions, one would also expect that the 
political parties of Kurdistan would retain some fundamentally tribal nature as well.  As the 
Kurdish tribes have now been within the authority of the Erbil government for about a decade, 
this process, if it is to occur, should be expected to be in progress already.  Evidence of tribal 
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influence on government might be the role of a quasi-Agha style of leadership at various levels 
of government, similar to the quasi-shaikh52 role of Saddam Hussein described by Baram.  
Additionally, a tendency towards Salzman’s “balanced opposition” in party politics and a strong 
preference for familial nepotism would demonstrate the influence of tribal values.  Tribes, 
similarly, would be expected to adopt one of Abu Jabar’s more cooperative models rather than 
retaining their military-ideological structure.   
 In Chapters 2 and 3, I will examine the nature of Kurdish tribes and the Kurdish “state” 
respectively, with the aim of determining which of these models best fits the Kurdish situation.  
Ultimately I will argue that a new understanding of segmentary opposition is needed in order to 
accurately understand the tribe-state interaction in Iraqi Kurdistan and the likely nature of the 
polity there.  Kurdish tribes, when strong, did provide the balanced opposition that Salzman 
describes.  Tribes under the control of state institutions, on the other hand, cannot provide this 
mechanism because violent conflict is no longer an acceptable means of evening the score 
between tribes.  Subjecting tribal actors to a system where political parties can freely form, 
however, restores the balanced opposition mechanism.  I argue in the following chapters that the 
KRG’s parties are modern replacements to the tribe, which restore the balanced opposition that a 
developed tribal system once provided.   Both individuals and groups can join these new tribes, 
which have their own mechanisms for maintaining parity versus one another.   
  
                                                 
52 This difference is linguistic; ‘shaikh’ in Arabic refers to a political leader who may also have religious authority, 
which is the role of the ‘agha’ in Kurdish society, whereas the Kurdish ‘shaikh’ is a more explicitly religious figure 
who has acquired political significance.  This relationship is developed in Chapter Two. 
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Chapter 2: Uniquely Kurdish Tribalism 
As indicated by several of the previously discussed authors studying Arab tribalism, the 
identity system in tribal societies is complicated.  Kurdish identity is a mix of family, tribe and 
political affiliations, not all of which overlap.  Different elements of this complicated identity 
system take precedence over one another depending on an individual’s location and 
circumstances.  The base of the Kurdish tribal system is an array of independent hierarchical 
social and political entities based on real or imagined kinship ties.  The structure of this type of 
social arrangement is relatively simple, but a detailed description of it is necessary to assess the 
validity of some of the theoretical claims discussed in chapter 1 of this paper.   
The other important identities which interact with tribalism are less clearly categorized.  
While certain identities are decidedly not tribe-based (in that they are not defined by the tribe of 
which one is a member) they are not necessarily non-tribal.  In fact, as will be shown here, 
religious identity for Kurds is often heavily tied to tribal boundaries and affiliations.  The second 
part of this chapter will attempt to explain how the roles of religious shaikh and tribe agha began 
to share and blur roles and responsibilities.   
The most thorough and up to date examination of Kurdistan’s tribal structures comes from 
anthropologist Martin Van Bruinessen in his ethnography Agha, Shaikh, and State; his work  will 
be used as the main guide to the following sketch of the Kurdish familial tribe’s structures. Van 
Bruinessen’s books are among the only comprehensive treatments of Kurdish tribalism in the 
modern age, and quite nearly all other work on the topic cites Agha, Shaikh, and State as a main 
source.  This chapter also relies very heavily on David McDowall’s crucial text, A Modern 
History of the Kurds, which is a thorough review of Kurdish history spanning from the pre-
Islamic era to the Gulf Wars.  McDowall is a British writer and intellectual who has served the 
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British Council and United Nations.  The latter part of this chapter relies heavily on Farhad 
Shakely’s article, “The Naqshbandi Shaikhs of Hawraman,” for background on the mystic orders 
of Kurdistan. Shakely is a prominent modern Kurdish poet and researcher who teaches at 
Uppsala University.  
In this chapter, I seek to show that Kurds are almost universally subject to identities which 
form along segmentary lines and function in a tribal manner.  While this is true almost by 
definition for the handful of remaining pastoral tribes in Kurdistan and fairly obvious for rural 
Kurds with traditional identities, it is not so obvious that this is true for urban families.  The goal 
of the descriptions here is to demonstrate conclusively that tribal mores and structures are fairly 
pervasive characteristics of all segments of Kurdish society.  
 
Kinship in the Kurdish Tribes 
A distinguishing factor about Kurdish familial tribes is that the shared common ancestor 
which tribes are united by is often a figure whose history is invented for the sake of making 
common cause between groups.  Bruinessen identifies multiple accounts of tribal confederations 
claiming common ancestors despite the various tribes all having well-recorded independent 
histories stretching far enough back to disprove the supposed common ancestry.53  This claim of 
common ancestry might be made for the sake of aligning groups that would otherwise come into 
conflict. In some extreme instances of imagined kinship, the common ancestor has been found to 
be a completely invented figure.  Bruinessen tells the story of two clans called Mahmudkan and 
Etmankan, whose lineages were combined after an Etman male defected to and was eventually 
made leader of the Mahmudkan. After reconciliation, the groups were merged. Several 
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generations later, the still-cooperating families speak of the leaders of the two groups as being 
biological brothers.54  
Imagined kinship ties are sometimes created by less prestigious households and lineages in 
an arrangement which binds them to their leaders.  These families will often claim that a 
particularly great local leader was their ancestor, or that they are related to a politically powerful 
family in their area.  It is unclear whether these imagined ties are intentional lies or simply tricks 
of memory.  It is possible that households and lineages may join up with a successful family and 
state that family’s name as their tribal allegiance, only to have this political tie be confused with 
an actual kinship tie several generations later. Either way, this tendency of families to bind 
themselves tribally to unrelated powerful families explains why successful tribes occasionally 
rapidly acquire thousands of new “relatives.” The result of this practice is a large tribe consisting 
of only a handful of actual related lineages and many unrelated lineages which follow them.  
This form of organization, sometimes referred to as a tribal coalition, is particularly common in 
times of armed conflict.  Treating these groups as inherently different from other tribes is 
pointless, however, as these coalitions often are interpreted later on to be real kinship groups.  
The very powerful Jaf tribe provides an example of this.  Claudius James Rich of the British East 
India Company in Baghdad in 1820 observed that about 600 of the several thousand households 
calling themselves Jaf claimed real Jaf lineage.55  British diplomat Cecil John Edmonds observed 
in 1921 that the Jaf had grown to 5,400 households claiming common descent.56  Other observers 
have noticed that Kurdish tribes in conflict tend to have a permanent as well as a fleeting 
component.  Much like mercenaries, the fleeting component of the tribe follows successful 
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55 Claudius James Rich. Narrative of a Residence in Koordistan. Farnborough, England: Gregg, 1972. P. 177. Cited 
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groups and flees when the leading tribe faces hardship.  This naturally leads to extreme volatility 
in the power base of a large tribal coalition 
 
Some Notes on Terminology 
 To effectively discuss tribal structures using language originally developed for discussing 
very different political structures, the use of some imported constructions which do not reflect 
the Kurds’ conception of their own tribal hierarchy is necessary.  The terms used for tribal 
structures in this paper: lineage, clan, tribe, and tribal confederation, do not translate well into 
Arabic, Turkish, and Farsi, and certainly not into Kurdish.  The best translations available for 
these concepts can only approximate the meaning that these terms carry for native speakers.  
Kurds variously refer to tribes, clans, classes, religious orders, and other groups with the use of 
the terms tayfe and ashiret, among others.  The distinctions between these words vary between 
regions and linguistic groups.  Rather than attempt to define all these terms here, the section 
below on the structure of Kurdish tribes defines these terms through usage while also describing 
the types of organization to which they occur.  The use of these terms throughout this paper is 
generally in line with what is described in this section.  The one word that requires additional 
defining is the word ‘tribe’, which is used in this paper as it was defined in the previous; as an 
independent, hierarchical, hereditary, and segmentary social and political entity which comprises 
more than one clear lineage.  While I attempted to be as specific as possible, the word tribe as 
used in this section should be thought of as more synonymous with the Kurdish ‘tayfe’, which 
seems to refer to a person’s primary tribal identity; at various times this  means a clan, a tribe, a 




The Structure of the Segmentary Tribe 
 The most basic level of the Kurdish tribal hierarchy is the household, which tends to be 
nuclear in structure.  One married couple and their unmarried children live in the house together, 
while married children move out as soon as it is feasible to do so.  Polygamy is a rare luxury of a 
few wealthy Kurds and does not really play a significant role.  The household is the level at 
which nearly all economic activity takes place, especially for nomadic and semi-nomadic Kurds.  
The household is also the primary level of ownership of wealth, land, and animals.  Generally 
property is spoken of as belonging to the household as a corporate unit, not just the head of the 
household. Though the household is almost always part of a larger structure, economic and 
personal decisions are made within the household.57 
 The smallest type of organization that can really be called tribal in the typical sense of the 
word is a lineage. A lineage is a group of households who usually live near each other and move 
and act with some degree of cohesion.  The lineage almost always has a clearly identified 
common ancestor, usually tied to all the households through biological, not imagined, kinship; 
often the household heads are his direct descendants.  The common ancestor is often still alive if 
the lineage is still acting as a clear unit. This is not to say that lineages do not continue 
cooperating after their common ancestor’s death, but the equality of brothers of different ages 
within the Kurdish family prevents there from being a clear leader of the lineage after the 
common ancestor is gone.58   
Lineages, more than any other level of Kurdish tribal society, clearly stick together in 
conflicts and group decisions.  Bruinessen suggests that one reason for this is the strong 
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preference for endogamy, and specifically for paternal female cousin marriage.59  This 
preference, when practiced consistently, creates extremely insular family arrangements wherein 
one has no marriage ties to anyone outside of one’s paternal grandparents’ family.  Thus when 
conflicts or disagreements arise between two lineages separated by more than two generations, 
there are rarely familial ties to hold them together.  Within the two-generation lineage, however, 
there are many different familial ties along which disputes can be assuaged.  Two males may be 
thrice brothers-in-law if they are cousins, but second cousins are unlikely to be anything besides 
second cousins.  
Lineages tend to stick together, but this comes with important qualifiers.  The first is that 
lineages are not top level political entities.  They are simply not large enough to provide the 
security that the tribal system attempts to provide, to defend significant territory as their own, or 
to influence politics without cooperation with other lineages.  Secondly, lineages almost never 
own or manage property as a corporate unit. Private land and possessions are owned by the 
household, whereas collective land for grazing is held by the village or nomadic clan.  The Kurds 
of Iraq who have moved onto the plains are an exception to this; lineages will sometimes 
maintain undivided estates and select a leader from among the sons of the common ancestor after 
his death.  In most cases, the power of the lineage leader comes from loyalty to him based on 
descent, and his ability to arbitrate disputes among his descendants.60   
Moving up the tribal structure from the lineage becomes far more complicated because 
higher levels of social and political organization take many different forms.  The Kurds of Iraq 
have, at various times, been subject to the laws and structure of Sunni religious entities, Persian 
and Ottoman kingdoms, European colonial rulers, and several vastly different iterations of the 
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state of Iraq.  They are organized into not only tribes but a number of quasi-tribal structures: 
clans, villages, principalities, religious orders, tribal confederations, and more recently, a secular 
autonomous region, its subdivisions, and political parties.  The result is a social order which 
retains the segmentary and hierarchical characteristics of tribes in widely varied manifestations.   
Continuing up the more standard side of the Kurdish tribal ladder from the lineage, the clan 
forms the first entity which has the ability to act as a significant independent faction.  Clans are 
theoretically still organized around kinship ties, but as mentioned earlier, these ties are often 
based on imagined shared ancestry.  They tend to live together; settled clans usually live in the 
same neighborhoods and semi-nomadic groups live together in both their summer and winter 
pastures.  Clans are the first level in the tribal structure to be defined in part by the territories 
which they control.  Clans do not actually own land, nor do they have legal rights with regard to 
governing land.  Yet it is clear that clans treat their grazing land as collective.  Households share 
pastures despite owning separate animals and smaller parcels of land.  Outsiders cannot use a 
clan’s traditional grazing lands without obtaining permission. Since the clans must function 
within the state’s framework, and since they do not actually own much of the land being referred 
to here as theirs, they cannot prevent groups from transgressing their land legally.  However, 
multiple examples can be found of settled clans in modern states charging a traveling group for 
crossing their traditional holdings.  This ability to control territory clearly speaks to the clan’s 
ability to exert power within the areas it inhabits.61 
Despite their geographical boundaries and significant political power, clans are far less 
permanent than other ranks in the tribal hierarchy. The fact that large portions of their 
membership are sometimes not bound to the leader by any real relationship allows their size, and 
therefore their territory, to fluctuate greatly from generation to generation.  The territory of clans 
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will split and merge as leadership struggles take place after a leader dies, or a clan will disperse 
totally when it comes upon bad fortune.  Lineages are fairly permanent due to their basis in real 
kinship, so the lineage at the core of a clan will likely continue to exist when the clan disperses, 
but the clans themselves come and go.  Tribes, as will be seen in a moment, are far more tied to 
permanent territorial boundaries by some combination of laws and expectations.  This difference 
in permanence is one of very few identifiable differences between the clan and the tribe; both can 
be totally independent and act as significant factions.  Both contain real kinship ties, imagined 
kinship ties, and explicitly political relationships.  There is significant evidence that many Kurds 
themselves do not perceive the difference between these two hierarchies, referring to their 
primary (clan or tribal) identity as their tayfe.  From an outsider’s perspective, however, there are 
clearly two different types of organization being discussed.  Certain named tayfe – the Jaf, 
Baban, Bahdinan to name a few – never became sub-units to other tayfe.  They may have gained 
and lost territory and influence over time, but they didn’t really ever disappear or leave their 
historic homes.62 
These units, which I follow Bruinessen’s example in calling tribes, are the largest groups in 
the segmentary tribal system.  The tribe is also the most nebulous and varied of all the levels 
discussed so far, as each tribe is a social, political organization and a territorial entity.  More 
recently, as will be seen, tribes can take on additional aspects by being tied to a particular 
religious order or province.  Tribes consist of a large number of clans, lineages, and villages, and 
thus have always been very significant political forces.   
Iraqi Kurdish state institutions are not explicitly structured with the tribes as components, 
but there are a number of ways in which tribes are able to wield their influence, and state 
institutions occasionally serve to reinforce this authority, as will be discussed in chapter 3.   
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  In modern northern Iraq, the tribes do not have real legal control over the land, and their 
ownership of the land is through their households’ ownership of individual parcels.   Actual 
jurisdiction over the land belongs to state or regional governments, and the legal codes do not 
really provide for special legal rights for tribal entities when it comes to controlling their historic 
lands.  In some instances, though, tribes have been able to hold onto the same contiguous lands 
over many generations despite changes in property law which made land a totally private 
commodity.  This would indicate a significant ability to prevent land sales to outsiders.  Though 
no examples could be found dealing specifically with Iraq, Bruinessen describes examples of 
Turkish Kurd tribes maintaining their tribal agricultural land through use of force.  When land 
traditionally belonging to the Reshkotan tribe was sold to an outsider, the tribe attacked the new 
landowners, sparking violent conflict between the Reshkotan and the new owners’ tribe.  After 
unrest broke out and Turkish authorities intervened, government mediators found it far easier to 
maintain the historic land claims by annulling the sale than to force the Reshkotan to accept the 
outsider.63 
Another type of tayfe that plays a role is the client tribe.  Client tribes are large, powerful 
units containing multiple clans and led by their own tribal agha, which are in some way 
subservient to a larger tribe.  This subservience is rarely kin-based since the client tribes and 
their clans tend to contain an entire powerful lineage at their core.  Client tribes have become 
subservient to paramount tribes either by choice or by subjugation.  In the past, a tribe that was 
decisively beaten or seriously outnumbered might choose to declare its allegiance to a more 
powerful tribe rather than face obsolescence.  Alternately, tribes might become clients to a more 
powerful tribe as part of a defensive move against another tribe or an external threat.  In more 
recent times, state power has prevented explicit violent conflict, but tribes can still become 
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clients to one another via more peaceful means.  When documents speak of large tribal 
federations or coalitions like the Jaf, the group being discussed is generally a single paramount 
tribe carrying the allegiance of several client tribes.  Just like the non-kin clans that made the Jaf 
increase and decrease in power so dramatically, client tribes tend to come and go with 
fluctuations in the core tribe’s fortune and power.64 
Due to the settled or semi-settled nature of almost all Iraqi Kurds by the turn of the twenty-
first century, the village must be considered as a level in the tribal structure which functions 
similarly to the clan.  Often they are literally the same thing; semi-nomadic clans may belong to 
the same village by their winter pastures and move to a common tent camp in the summer.  Other 
times, clans of the same tribe will be divided between multiple villages, or a few clans may 
cohabitate a few villages with no village clearly belonging to one clan or another. Villages in 
agricultural areas gain another level of complexity in that the peasant farmers in such villages are 
generally non-tribal.  Though these non-tribal villagers are not directly subject to the tribes in 
modern Iraq, the higher social and political status of tribesmen makes the non-tribal villagers at 
least slightly subservient to the tribal villagers.65  
It is possible that in previous eras the village was simply a manifestation of the clan or a 
group of clans, with little to no structural importance or political power in and of itself.  Besides 
their lack of importance in Kurds’ view of political organization, villages also were more heavily 
populated by non-tribal peasant farmers than by tribal pastoralists.66 Their role as an important 
step in the tribal structure, however, has been solidified by the imposition of state structures over 
tribal areas.  Governments built around the idea of provinces and capitals have struggled to deal 
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with tribal forms of organization and nomadic people generally.  The settled village, though 
often unoccupied in the case of semi-nomadic Kurds, provided a location that a group of people 
could be tied to in the eyes of such governments.  Villages thus became the place where 
government buildings were constructed, armies stationed, and Pashas installed.  For tribes who 
did live in villages, this proximity to centers of power caused the village to have a place of 
importance in and of itself.  The forming of new tribes among the peasantry due to the rise of 
village Shaikhs, to which a separate section of this paper is dedicated, also helped the village 
become an important center in the tribal system since a shaikh’s core following would often be 
the village he inhabited.  
 
“Non-Tribal” Kurdistan 
 A very common mistake made when discussing tribal systems is to assume that all Kurds 
are tribal.  This is not the case; there is a large, historically non-tribal peasant contingent in most 
Kurdish villages. In addition to these peasants, a newly non-tribal (or perhaps even anti-tribal) 
population exists in more urban areas across Iraqi Kurdistan.  Despite these groups existing to 
some extent outside of the tribal structure, they are still very much affected by tribal politics.  
Furthermore, some groups claiming to be non-tribal modern urbanites are still subject to the 
remnants of tribal loyalties entrenched in the structures of neighborhoods and extended families.   
 It appears to be a long-standing struggle for scholars on Kurdistan to estimate the portion 
of the population that is tribal.  The reasons for this difficulty are telling in themselves.  Firstly, 
the definition of tribal versus non-tribal is very hard to identify.  Very nearly all Kurds, and 
certainly all Muslim Kurds, have some sort of heritage either in a tribe or in a population which 
was directly ruled by a tribe within a few generations. Many urbanites who have long abandoned 
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a nomadic and pastoral life express some sort of allegiance to their extended family which an 
outsider would identify with tribalism.  Yet these urbanites, often identifying with socialist or 
nationalist political identities, would probably balk at the use of the lexicon of tribalism to 
describe their families.67 Secondly, the oppression of Kurds by the governments that rule over 
them has often prevented the collection of good statistics.  Several scholars complained of the 
difficulty of even identifying who was and was not a Kurd in the Turkish and Iranian regions, as 
those governments have at various times attempted to delegitimize Kurdish as a valid identity.68  
Van Bruinessen notes that even during its more progressive periods, Turkey severely limited the 
definition of ‘Kurd’ in its census data, only counting those who spoke exclusively Kurdish.69  
Finally, social mobility between tribal and non-tribal groups is significant, especially during 
times of conflict or hardship.  Tribal leaders in need of fighting men have often tapped peasant 
populations.  In the other direction, tribes who have been subdued by their neighbors or state 
forces or who have come upon hard times economically have sometimes resorted to cultivation.  
Even more confusingly, these newly-made peasant populations often retain their tribal social 
structures even as they give up on tribal authority (Bruinessen 116).  All of these factors 
significantly blur the boundaries of who is tribal and who is not.   
 Still, there are ways to estimate the portion of the population that is tribal.  The studies of 
Rich and Edmonds on the Jaf tribe, approximately a century apart, did not explicitly provide for 
the distinction between tribal and non-tribal, but they did distinguish between settled and 
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nomadic.70  It is important to note that these categories are not synonymous; settled tribesmen 
and migrant peasants certainly exist.  Since settled groups tend towards a loosening of tribal 
structure, and groups which join mobile tribes tend to become part of that tribe, information on 
settled versus unsettled families can be used to get a broad sense of portions of the population in 
the tribal versus non-tribal categories.  Additionally, the social position of settled subjugated 
tribes is not far from that of peasants in that they are kept in “nearly feudal dependence”.71  
Similarly, Rich found the status of newly nomadic tribes to be essentially equal to that of those 
who had never been sedentary; they were treated as tribesmen.72   
Rich and Edmonds provide three important pieces of information on the portion of the Jaf 
population that was settled versus unsettled. Firstly, the ratio of settled to unsettled families 
under a tribe’s jurisdiction varies widely over time.  In 1820 about 30% of the population of the 
Jaf tribe was settled and the rest nomadic.  In 1920 the portion of settled families was much 
higher but also harder to define.73  Edmonds noted that sedentary status was temporary and 
undesirable; nomads became sedentary out of poverty or conquest, and sought to become 
nomadic again as soon as possible.74  There were continual shifts in both directions as families 
fell upon bad or good fortune. Secondly, both settled and non-settled groups made up significant 
portions of the population; thirty percent is the smallest minority of settled families recorded, 
while twenty percent is the smallest minority of nomadic tribesmen recorded.  Thus each of these 
groups has the potential to play a major role in political structures, especially in times of 
violence.   
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The group referred to here as peasants are non-tribal peoples living outside of major cities.  
In modern Iraqi Kurdistan, access to education at least through age 15 and numerous subsidized 
higher education options have led to significant mobility out of the agricultural class.  
Additionally, the introduction of farm machinery has led to decreased need for agricultural 
workers.  Thus, the peasant class is rapidly diminishing, or at least rapidly resorting to trades 
other than agriculture. Agriculture is still the largest single industry, claiming 27% of the 
workforce.75  Historically, peasant farmers in Kurdistan fell into four categories: land-bound 
sharecroppers resembling serfs, renters, owners, and migrant workers.  As heavier machinery and 
fertilizer have become necessary elements of agriculture, larger landowners including foreign 
corporations have bought up large parcels of arable land, and these types of farmers have 
coalesced into a more general class of agricultural employees.  These peasants are 
disproportionally religious and ethnic minorities, with Armenian Christians making up the most 
significant group in Iraq.  Muslim Kurdish peasants often retain some sort of tribal structure 
despite being clearly subservient to more successful tribes, but those Christian peasants who 
remain in Iraq tend to be more obviously non-tribal, as most Christian tribes vacated the area 
previously or were dispersed in the conflicts of the twentieth century.76 
When a peasant population is within the jurisdiction of a tribe, it almost always makes up a 
subjugated working class which is somehow subsidiary to the tribal structure.  The most 
common way in which the power of the tribe over villages is maintained is through the collection 
of a tithe of some sort from agriculturalists.  Tribal aghas have usually succeeded in collecting 
some sort of tithe even as society has rapidly changed, though the details of this process enter 
into the confusing quasi-legal world of tribal land ownership.  Much land is owned by individual 
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households, but occasionally the agha himself legally owns the land in a village.  The way this 
came to be is dubious from the perspective of fairness.  Traditionally, tithes to the local or tribal 
agha were paid for the upkeep of the village guest house, which served as the village center.  
Other times the tithe would be a payment for the agha’s dispute resolution services.  Either way, 
the payments could be more accurately be described as feudal dues than as rent payments.  It is 
clear that ownership of the land was not implied in this system by the fact that changes in respect 
or balance of power could cause the payments to transfer away from one agha or shaikh to 
another.  This system of feudal payments persisted through the Ottoman era. The British and the 
British-backed government of Iraq interpreted many of these payments as renter’s fees, and thus 
registered the land as owned by the agha who collected the payments.  Even in cases where the 
land isn’t officially registered to the agha in ownership, he has generally succeeded in forcing the 
collections under one of the guises mentioned earlier.  The only instances where the payments 
have been significantly disrupted were times when socialist and nationalist movements inspired 
peasants to reject their landlords; this trend has largely ceased as the KRG has gotten 
increasingly democratic, and the socialist parties have ceased encouraging such acts of civil 
disobedience.77  
In some instances which have become less common over time, the exertion of a tribal 
agha’s authority has been more aggressively enforced.  While village and clan aghas enforce 
tithe collections through ties and social pressure, a tribal agha who subjugated unrelated tribes 
generally coerced payments and enforced loyalty via threat of raids.  Some tribes in modern Iraq 
used a different method of payment; the paramount agha in a region would require that each clan 
and village send some of its peasants to work in his fields for a few days each year.  This 
happened as recently as the 1960s under the rule of the Pizhdar, and perhaps more ironically, at 
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the hands of a governor appointed by the nationalist movement after the agha’s overthrow.  For 
the more permanent peasant populations this may not have been any more coercive than what 
they were used to, but settled tribal Kurds remember this experience as particularly 
humiliating.78  
More recently, such explicit coercion has been made illegal.  Combined with increasing 
social mobility and urbanization, the rule of law has caused a decrease in the authority of tribal 
aghas.  Thanks to the pressure of conservatism in rural areas and nomadic groups and the 
permanent need for dispute mediation, the aghas still carry significant influence.  
 The other major group that is labeled as non-tribal are urbanites, who reject the very 
concept.  People in urban areas make up a significant portion of the region’s modern population; 
Erbil, Duhok, and Sulemania together make up 23% of the population of the KRG.79  The entire 
population of Iraqi Kurdistan is young to an unprecedented degree; 36% of the population is 14 
or younger, and 50% of the population is 20 or younger.  Though this is not a uniquely urban 
phenomenon, its effects are most visible in the cities where the cultural hold of rural 
conservatism is weakest.  More than half of the population in both urban and rural areas has had 
access to modern education for most of their lives, and has lived in an autonomous and 
increasingly prosperous Kurdish region throughout their adolescence.  Kurdish nationalism, 
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liberalism, and socialism are the main political inspirations, and being accused of “tribalism” can 
ruin a politician’s reputation in these areas.80  
 Lest this paint an image of a population that is truly divorced from tribalism, several facts 
and anecdotes are worth noting.  Despite the fact that educated youths espouse a rhetoric which 
rejects tribalism, they appear quite quick to return to tribal lines in the traditional fashion as soon 
as there is a disagreement between major tribal groups.  Van Bruinessen tells the story of a 
Kurdish village in Turkey, where in 1973 someone of one lineage was killed by someone of 
another lineage by accident. A violent blood feud did not erupt, as the culprit and his brothers 
had fled, and modern mores and laws prevented the killer’s relatives from being targeted.  But 
tension did not dissipate and clearly spread even to the younger generation.  In what at first 
seemed like an attempt to reject the feud, five students one day informed Van Bruinessen that 
they were going (dynamite) fishing together.  Yet by accompanying them, Van Bruinessen 
observed that even these ostensible friends did not quite trust each other enough to share a boat 
or walk together (while all involved were carrying dynamite).81  Even if such behavior is 
couched in terms of family loyalty, it is hard to distinguish between that and the tribal faction-
forming that would take place in a rural area if something similar occurred.  It is not surprising 
that even young, modern urban populations are still affected by a tribal mentality; they are 
mostly either recent migrants to these urban areas or first-generation native urbanites.  The 
growth of the Kurdistan Region’s three largest cities in recent decades shows this clearly; only 
since the middle of the twentieth century have they become the major urban centers that they are 
today.  Combined with significant intermarriage between the urban elites and the better-off 
former nomads from the cities, this means that very few young Kurds cannot find a parent or 
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grandparent who was either from a tribal entity or directly subject to a tribe as a village-dwelling 
peasant.    
 Even if it is to be accepted that many urbanites have “de-tribalized” in the way that many 
assert that they have, the makeup of political parties ensures continued contact with the tribes.  
While previous eras saw a clear political divide between the less tribal, more socialist urbanites 
of Sulemania and the more tribal groups around Duhok and Erbil, the modern governing 
coalition relies on support from nationalists in multiple cities as well as tribesmen.  These bases 
often diverge sharply on social issues, and so it is reasonable to suspect that the coalition would 
not hold up during peacetime.  The current political situation has created remarkable unity for 
reasons that will be discussed at length later.  For the purposes of this section, it suffices to say 
that tribesmen follow their allegiances, urbanites want independence for either nationalist or 
liberal reasons, and Sunni Islamists want separation from the newly Shi’a government in 
Baghdad.   
 
The Collision of Religious Orders and the Tribal System 
 Further complicating this variable tribal arrangement is the relationship between tribes or 
tribe-like structures and Islamic religious organizations and leaders.  In Kurdistan, the most 
visible collision between political and religious structures occurred as mystic orders began to 
spread through the region.  Mystic orders’ ability to often exist within the Sunni and Shi’a 
establishment while also maintaining their independence and identity has made them powerful 
forces in Kurdish tribal politics.  As will be seen, it is sometimes difficult to tell where the tribal 
leadership’s power ends and that of religious authorities begins. Understanding this mixing of 
authority is crucial to understanding the current political power structure as well as the limits of 
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tribal identity in Kurdistan.  The religious orders eventually became totally woven into the fabric 
of Kurdish tribal leaders, but in this process the role of tribes in society was fundamentally 
altered. 
 Though religious orders have played a part in Kurdish politics since the early centuries of 
Islam, the most relevant recent arrival of a mystic order in Kurdistan took place throughout the 
1800s with the rapid growth of the Qadiri and Naqshbandi orders.  The Qadiri had existed among 
several prominent families in Kurdistan for hundreds of years; the Barzinjis of Sulaymaniya and 
the Sayyids of Nihri both claimed descent from the order’s twelfth century founder Abd al-Qadir 
Gilani.  These families both held the privileged sayyid status of claiming descent from the 
Prophet, and so the leaders of the families were able to maintain strict control over the order by 
ensuring that only their family members were initiated into the order.82  In this system, the 
religious order was clearly subservient to the tribal structure, and as a result the power of the 
order was either coopted as a normal part of tribal leaders’ legitimacy or limited to mostly 
apolitical spiritual leadership.  This arrangement, that is, the lack of independently powerful 
religious orders, was the situation throughout most of Kurdistan at the outset of the 19th 
century.83 
  The seeds of the destruction of this system can be found in two main places.  In 1810 
Shaikh Khalid, a Kurdish noble of the Jaf tribe who had studied under both sayyid families as a 
Qadiri scholar, traveled to India to meet a shaikh of the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi order.  He soon 
began claiming powers including foresight, the ability to grant immunity from harm, and 
communication with the dead.84  The other element can be found in the strategy of early 
nineteenth century Istanbul.  By this time, Istanbul had set out to suppress the Kurdish satrapies 
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and principalities within Ottoman borders, and often had attempted to do so by upsetting the 
existing power structures of the region at the expense of law and order.  Additionally, the 
Naqshbandi order’s orthodox Sunni views called for loyalty to the Sultan, whereas the local 
Kurdish power centers of the Qadiri were less tied to the empire’s interests.  Whether this was a 
part of a broader strategy to incorporate the fickle principalities on the Persian border or in 
response to a series of particularly destructive set of wars that Kurdish chiefs had instigated is a 
matter of some debate.  Either way, it appears that Istanbul deliberately encouraged Mahmud 
Baban to invite Khalid back to Kurdistan.  Khalid quickly began acquiring his own following.  
Notably this new Naqshbandi-Khalidi order began to exert influence over the rulers of Baban, 
directly threatening their allegiance to the Qadiri-supported Barzinji princes.  More importantly 
for the discussion on tribal structure was the fact that a rapidly spreading and truly independent 
religious order was generating a powerful following of its own and gaining enough power to 
influence or coerce political leaders.85 
 Another reason why the Naqshbandi order spread so quickly and so fundamentally 
altered tribal politics has to do with its own leadership structure.  The Qadiriya, and most other 
orders, have a centralized authority which appointed all of the order’s shaikhs.  The deputies of 
the Naqshbandi order, on the other hand, were entitled to train and initiate their own deputy 
shaikhs.  This pyramid-like structure was able to spread much more quickly and maintain a much 
more oppositional posture than the traditional Qadiri shaikhs, who were all more or less directly 
subservient to the Qadiriyya of the Barzinji and Sayyid families.  This made the Naqshbandi 
order so attractive that many Qadiriya shaikhs converted to the new school.  The Naqshbandi 
rapidly became numerous, influential, and widespread.  Importantly, tribal leaders lower in the 
political order were able to either become trained in the school as shaikhs themselves or enlist 
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the help of a Naqshbandi shaikh to gain religious legitimacy at the same structural level of the 
princely ruling families’ Qadiri authority.86 
 Immediately, the new shaikhs began to wield their political power in meaningful ways.  
The ongoing demise of the most powerful principalities in the Ottoman empire’s eastern 
marches, actively encouraged by Istanbul, had removed much of the conflict-resolution and 
protective structures in Kurdistan.  Shaikhs in Baban lands began to mediate disputes between 
competing Baban rulers, a role that normally would have been reserved for a higher-level tribal 
leader.  Shaikhs gained power most quickly and most effectively in regions with many feuding 
tribes, thus filling the power vacuum that normally would have been filled by a more powerful 
conquering tribe.  By provoking and resolving conflicts to their benefit, they became a potent 
political authority in these areas. They found it more difficult to penetrate areas dominated by a 
large tribe such as the Jaf, because the tribal leaders remained the undisputed conflict arbitrators 
in these areas.  Additionally, the Naqshbandi shaikhs struggled to exert authority in organized 
villages and other areas closer to government power centers where there was no power vacuum 
to fill.87 
 Far from being strict oppositionists, the Naqshbandi shaikhs actively sought integration 
into the existing power structure.  Early on, Ahmad Pasha of Baban joined the order and became 
prince.  Rizaquli Khan of Sandaj, prince of Ardalan, also joined the order.88   
 The Naqshbandi shaikhs’ political strategies soon made them a totally integrated, and 
occasionally indistinguishable, part of the tribal system.  Since the order allowed the 
appointment of deputies, shaikhs were able to initiate their own relatives as deputies who 
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‘reported to’ them in the order’s structure.  While there wasn’t a clear hierarchy of authority 
between the shaikhs, the teacher-student relationship certainly generated loyalties.  When 
combined with existing tribal notions of patrilineal kinship authority, these loyalties became very 
difficult to qualitatively distinguish from a tribal loyalty.  Power was exerted through an 
expectation of familial loyalty.  The Naqshbandiya also gained political authority by soliciting 
their abilities as conflict mediators and leaders to peasant villagers who previously had no 
potential arbiter besides their local tribal leader.  Some shaikhly families’ tribes were not long-
standing tribes, but rather a following of peasant villager families who defected from more 
oppressive neighboring tribes.  The shaikh structure provided the protection through unity that 
would normally be provided by patronage to a tribal authority, except that it was accessible to 
peasants who normally were subject to raids even at the whims of their own tribal leaders.   
The final merging of the shaikhly religious structure and the older tribal structure occurred 
through intermarriage between the major tribal families and the upstart shaikhly dynasties.  The 
major tribal chiefs, rapidly declining in power in the face of the shaikh’s growing authority and 
the loss of favor of Istanbul, were eager to coopt the religious authority of the shaikhs.  
Meanwhile, the marriages cemented the shaikhly families’ status as explicitly political 
authorities.89 
By the second half of the nineteenth century, Kurdistan’s tribal politics had become 
inseparable from the religious politics of the shaikhly families.  With Istanbul’s destruction of 
the non-shaikhly principality ruling families which held sway before, three crucial political 
dynasties occupied the scene, all of which claimed shaikhly status.  The shaken but still 
important Qadiri Barzinji princes briefly lost but eventually regained control of Sulaymania.  The 
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Sayyids, now fully converted to the Naqshbandi order, ruled in Nihri.  The upstart Naqshbandi 
Barzanis, from their namesake Barzan, were the most powerful group in what is now Iraqi 
Kurdistan.   
How then, do the shaikhly dynasties differ from the older tribes? They are the leaders of 
political power structures held together by ties of real or imagined kinship and religious 
authority, and inherited on vaguely patrilineal lines.  In each of these respects, they are tribes in 
the normal sense of the word.  The most significant difference for the purpose of this paper is 
that the shaikhly dynasties are able to exert direct political influence over both seminomadic 
tribes and settled peasant villagers.  As Kurdish political parties developed, this would turn out to 
be crucial in bridging the gap between the two populations.  By the turn of the twentieth century, 
the political and religious structures were fully merged.  The titleshaikh came to be applied to 
leaders of tribal structures regardless of the leader’s religious affiliation.   
For the Naqshbandi shaikhs, another crucial difference lies in their allegiance to Istanbul.  
The Naqshbandi, ardent Sunnis, tended to be unwilling to be disobedient to the Sultan, and were 
thus opposed to political efforts against him. This would eventually place many tribal leaders at 
odds with Mustafa Kemal’s Turkish nationalist revolution which initially sought to incorporate 
them.  Additionally, the more aggressive Sunnism of the Naqshbandiya would later combine 
with the significant anti-colonial (and thus anti-Christian) reaction that swept the falling Ottoman 
empire.  These sentiments likely contributed heavily to the willingness, or even eagerness, of 
some Kurdish groups to participate in a young Turkey’s efforts to “relocate” Armenians.  This 
participation in genocide, besides being tragic, cost the Kurds a lot of American, French, and 
British goodwill at the crucial Vienna peace conference after the First World War.90   
 
                                                 




The first crucial concept which has been reviewed here regards the segmentary nature of 
the Kurdish tribe.  The degree to which an individual takes the side of another in a tribal dispute 
is at least in part determined by that individual’s perception of the tribal “distance” between 
them.   Thus disputes between those in different lineages mobilize whole lineages; those between 
tribes mobilize whole tribes, and so forth.  It can also be seen from the anecdotes in this chapter 
that these identities matter enough that people still fear blood feuds enough to flee when their 
close relative has besmirched the honor of one in another lineage.  It should be noted, however, 
that there are many different sizes and strengths of tribe in Kurdistan.  While small groups will 
almost always be faced with opposition comparable in size to themselves, a large tribe targeting 
a small tribe need not fear “balanced opposition”, at least exclusively at the tribal level.   
Secondly, this chapter demonstrates that the concept of a person or group being “non-
tribal” is a bit of a misnomer when discussing Kurdish society.  Someone with no tribal 
affiliation in a rural area is likely subject to the whims of a tribal entity in one way or another.  A 
person in an urban environment might be actively opposed to the concept of tribal identity, but 
would still be influenced by their recent ancestors having either been a part of or subject to a 
tribal system.  As a result, serious disputes between families tend to maintain a decidedly tribal 
character.  This remains true for the younger generation. 
Finally, and most generally, it must be said that the religious, social, and political 
affiliations of Kurds are heavily intertwined.  Religious leaders in many villages have a role to 
play that is explicitly political, and many have taken advantage of their religious authority to rise 
to political power.  Political leaders of the past were also spiritual guides, and as such it would 
not be surprising if modern political leaders were subtly expected to fulfill a similar role.  The 
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maintenance of political power in the tribal sphere relies heavily on highly personal pressures.  




Chapter 3: The New Tribes 
  Both of the major political parties in Iraqi Kurdistan have occasionally been accused of 
‘tribalism’.  Generally, this accusation points to nepotistic behavior in party and government 
appointments and in fact, the two leading Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party 
(KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), do in fact engage in nepotism.    When 
discussing a tribe, it is natural for family members to be given positions of responsibility; the 
tribe is hereditary and thus an inherently nepotistic structure.  This preference for appointing 
family members to office appears to have been carried over into both major political parties of 
Iraqi Kurdistan.  But the parties’ tribal tendencies are not limited to nepotism.  In this chapter I 
argue that the parties have acted in a fundamentally tribal way despite their rhetorical rejection of 
tribalism.  This can be seen both by the parties’ familial composition and in the nature of their 
conflicts with each other during the second half of the twentieth century. 
 
Nepotism in the KDP and PUK 
The party at whom the accusation of tribalism is most often leveled is the KDP.  This is to 
be expected, since the KDP is generally the more conservative of the Kurdish parties, and had 
generally been headed by the Barzani family, which has a long tribal heritage as the Shaikhs of 
Barzan.  A look at the composition of the modern KDP and the government of the KRG reveals 
that they are to some extent Barzani family businesses.  The current president of the KRG, 
Massoud Barzani, is a son of the famous leader Mullah Mustafa Barzani.  Mulla Mustafa’s other 
sons were Idris Barzani, who (like his son Nechirvan is now) was a prominent party leader, and 
Wajy Barzani, who is a General in the Kurdish Peshmerga.  Massoud’s sons are Masrour, who is 
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a KDP intelligence officer; and Mansour and Wajy, who both serve as high-ranking Peshmerga 
officers.91 
 The PUK, by contrast, is explicitly anti-tribal in orientation.  Its socialist doctrines are 
diametrically opposed to what it sees as a holdover of feudal society.92  As such, it is less often 
accused of nepotism or tribalism.  Yet the Talabani family maintains a significant presence in the 
upper echelon of the PUK and of Kurdish society.  The lynchpin here appears to be Talabani’s 
marriage to Aero Ahmad, as a number of the appointments are her relatives.  Jalal Talabani is the 
president of Iraq (a mainly ceremonial position).  His son Qubad was made the Deputy Prime 
Minister of the KRG as part of the unity government agreement formed after the last election, 
and represents KRG interests to the United States.  Bayaz Talabani, Jalal’s cousin, is the KRG’s 
Finance Minister.  Aero Ahmad Talabani, Jalal’s wife, is the owner several media companies in 
Kurdistan including Hewal, a major news weekly, and KurdSat Television.  Mullah Baxtiar, 
Aero Ahmad’s father, is on the PUK Politburo.  Shanaz Ahmed, Aero’s sister, is the PUK 
representative to the United Kingdom, and her husband is the Minister for water and irrigation 
for Iraq.  Lahur Talabani, Jalal’s nephew, is the leader of the PUK’s counter-terrorism unit.  Latif 
Rashid, Jalal’s brother-in-law, is a government minister. Bavel Talabani, Jalal’s son, is the head 
of the PUK’s special forces.  Hama Sabir, Aero’s brother-in-law, is Iraq’s ambassador to 
China.93 
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 Purely listing the Barzani and Talabani family members who are in each party would give 
the impression that the PUK is the more nepotistic, but this is not quite a fair assessment.  The 
nepotism of the PUK appears to be more tightly focused around Talabani’s immediate family.  
This makes sense considering that Jalal Talabani doesn’t have an official affiliation with a major 
tribe.  The Barzani family, on the other hand, is the historic lead family of a large tribal coalition 
in the northwest of the Kurdish region focused around the village of Duhok.  As such, the 
nepotism of the KDP involves not only the Barzani family, but its traditional allies. While it is 
nearly impossible to identify exact allegiances for individual members of parliament, a look at 
the KDP’s current members of parliament is highly telling.  There are 111 seats in the Kurdish 
parliament, of which 100 are not restricted. (The other 11 are reserved for ethnic and religious 
minorities.) Of the 36 KDP members of parliament, 21 come from the city of Duhok or its 
immediate vicinity, and 23 come from the area that is typically within the area of influence of the 
Barzani family.  It is not likely that all of these people are tribal allies of Barzani, but it is also 
highly unlikely that such an arrangement occurred naturally, given that Duhok’s population of 
approximately 350,000 makes up only 4% of the region’s population.94 
 It is easy to see why in political discourse nepotism is sometimes referred to as, “the 
Kurdish disease.”  To say that of the major parties of Kurdistan is not truly a condemnation of 
them, as nepotism appears to be the norm in Kurdish politics.  The presence of such nepotism is, 
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Tribal Behavior in the Kurds’ 20
th
 Century Conflicts 
 From the rise of the Ba’ath party in Iraq in 1960 to the formation of a united Kurdish 
administration in 1987, the two major political coalitions in the Kurdish region engaged in a 
campaign for greater autonomy from the government in Baghdad.  Simultaneously, they 
struggled against each other for primacy as representatives of the Kurdish movement in Iraq and 
internationally.   Though portrayals of the conflict were nearly always framed in terms of 
political party identity and ideology, the struggle closely followed patterns of age-old tribal 
conflict.  The major Kurdish factions were organized in blocs which relied heavily on tribal 
support, and the conflict itself followed many of the patterns that tribal conflicts followed 
previously.  This is true of both major Kurdish factions involved, and the government in 
Baghdad.   The actors’ descriptions of themselves would give an image of a struggle between a 
moderate democratic Kurdish party, a socialist Kurdish workers’ party, and an Arab nationalist 
regime.  Ultimately, the conflict is better characterized as a repeat of earlier conflicts: a struggle 
between rival Kurdish factions heavily influenced by tribalism, taking place in the context of a 
broader hegemonic struggle between non-Kurdish actors.   
 At a very practical level, the fighting between Kurdish groups during the conflicts of the 
1960s-1980s were continuations of tactics normally associated with fighting between tribal 
groups.  One such tactic is the focus on rapid, guerrilla attacks with the goal of causing fright, 
damage, and chaos.  This tactic is highly reminiscent of the tribal raiding tactics of old.   The 
typical tactics of a raiding band were vicious, but limited.95  Avoiding large-scale killing enabled 
tribesmen to avoid having an unpayable blood debt upon their heads in the eyes of their enemies. 
In more recent conflicts a similar tactic can be seen with the attacks on important industries or 
against small bands of fighters.  In 1969, Mulla Mustafa Barzani ordered attacks on the Kirkuk 
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oil fields, not against Iraqi soldiers or a civilian area, as the opening round of hostilities with the 
Baghdad government.96   In isolation this would not be indicative of anything; the attack could 
have been targeted at the oil field because it is a high value target, or because the Iraqis were 
significantly better armed than Barzani’s fighters.  But a long list of attacks by the forces of 
Kurdish parties reveals that tribal combat tactics are the norm.   
Once again harking back to an earlier era, party leaders often opted for quick raids on their 
enemies’ small expeditionary bands or leadership.  These raids seem to be designed more to 
scatter and decapitate the enemy by killing its leaders than to kill many enemy soldiers.  In the 
tribal context this makes sense; eliminate the unifying tribal figure and the tribal coalition is no 
more.  When whole groups did engage in fierce combat, the size of the forces involved is telling 
as well.  One of the most widely criticized actions of the fighting in the 1970s was the attack by 
7,500 KDP fighters on a small band of Talabani’s men under the lead of Ali Askari, who were 
annihilated.97  Such a large mobilization was not the norm of combat in modern Kurdistan, just 
like it was not the norm of tribal fighting earlier in Kurdish history.   
Beyond the fighting fitting a tribal pattern, the broader strategy that each faction engaged in 
fit the mold of earlier tribal conflicts.   Understanding this pattern better requires taking a look 
back at the political situations that tended to surround Kurdish tribal conflict.   
The first pattern which applies to almost all instances of Kurdish tribal conflict is one of 
courting autonomy.  Kurdish tribal leaders court autonomy when they tread the delicate ground 
between independence (which could isolate them) and actual subservience (which would render 
them powerless).  The Kurdish principalities engaged in this careful game for most of the history 
of the Ottoman Empire.  In a near-perfect replication of Ibn Khaldoun’s theory of cyclical tribal 
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power, they asserted themselves when the state was weak, but were sufficiently conciliatory 
during periods of imperial weakness to make incorporating them a better option than conquering 
them.98   By remaining on the periphery of an empire, they were usually able to hold near-
absolute power for themselves without being subject to the whims of another empire or another 
Kurdish tribe’s expansionist urges.  
A separate but related aspect of classic Kurdish political strategy is straddling the border 
between two or more larger powers’ areas of control, and playing the margin to maximize their 
own influence and protect tribal authority.   Specifically, this behavior characterized the actions 
of Kurdish tribes during the Ottoman-Safavid struggle of the 1500s.  The influence of each 
empire at that time reached into, but didn’t cross, the mountains.  The Kurdish tribes further into 
one zone or the other might have been essentially stuck within one orbit, but many examples can 
be found of tribes hopping from one camp to the other, and using the threat of their conversion as 
a means for obtaining political leverage.  McDowall specifically explores the histories of the 
houses of Ardalan and Baban, who seem to have methodically kept one part of the family in each 
camp as a source of refuge.  While the Kurds often succeeded in doing this as a means of 
opposing imperial power, empires often also succeeded in using the Kurds against one another 
militarily by recruiting tribes along the borders into their service. This tactic provided the dual 
benefits of advantage versus the enemy and the potential weakening of the Kurds in use.99  
Another crucial aspect of this model is that this switching of sides is not something which Kurds 
do in unison.  In fact, it would be a mischaracterization to say that the Kurds even do it without 
regard for one another; in fact the motivation for switching sides seems more often to be to gain 
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the upper hand versus a tribal rival than to maintain a certain position in the eyes of a foreign 
empire.   
  In the modern era, the powers which the Kurds have attempted to remain peripheral to 
have changed, but the fundamental conduct of Kurdish groups has not.  During the conflicts from 
the 1960s to the 1980s, each of the major Kurdish factions came very close to an agreement with 
Baghdad that would have been significantly better than the way the conflict actually played out, 
both for them and the Iraqi Kurds generally.  Yet neither group took this opportunity, instead 
choosing to retain authority over its own zone of influence.   
In the early days of Hussein’s Ba’athist regime, Mulla Mustafa Barzani was fairly clearly 
the most important Kurdish leader.  Many traditional rivals of the Barzani shaikhs were 
displeased with this reality, but it was a reality nonetheless.100  The Ba’ath regime, seeking to 
further consolidate its hold on power, declared not an autonomous Kurdistan but a smaller 
autonomous zone centered on the Barzani stronghold of Duhok, with the aim of recruiting 
Barzani to the Iraqi government’s side.101 It should be noted that at this time the Ba’ath party was 
not the neo-tribal group which Saddam Hussein would later build to promote the interests of his 
own family and village.  In the early days of Saddam’s rule, the Ba’ath party was still a 
revolutionary movement which seems to have been very much committed to the socialist and 
Iraqi nationalist points of its platform.  The Iraqi Ba’athists disregarded ethnicity as the primary 
source of identity, insisting that Arabs, Kurds, and Turks should be equal partners in a new 
Iraq.102  As such, the situation of the Kurds in a united, Ba’athist republic had a good chance of 
being better than it had ever been before.   
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The overture initially succeeded in wooing Barzani to the Ba’athist cause.  He began 
serious conversations with Baghdad, but always maintained an unwillingness to give up 
autonomy for the Kurdish regions.103  Following the failure to reach agreement on a number of 
points, neither the Kurds nor the Ba’athists were willing to make further concessions or act upon 
the more difficult parts of the tentative agreements that had been reached.104  The standoff 
culminated in the exchange of accusations between Kurdish authorities and Baghdad and the 
total collapse of the accord in 1973.105   
As chances for a peaceful negotiated solution disappeared in the years after 1973, Barzani’s 
goal appears to have been the same.  He was willing to talk to Baghdad on the condition that the 
Kurdish region would maintain a large degree of self-governance (read: governance by the 
Barzanis) in any agreement that was reached.  As soon as Baghdad began seeking any type of 
meaningful authority over the Kurdish region, Barzani balked.106  Certainly some of Barzani’s 
hesitation was justified; one of Baghdad’s demands was that the Kurds abandon direct 
negotiations with Iran, which remained a lifeline for them.  Yet specific issues don’t seem to 
have been the core of the problem.  The pattern was repeated after Idris Barzani gave in on the 
Iran point, promising that the Kurds would cut their ties if agreement was reached.  After 
tentative agreement was reached between Idris Barzani and Saddam Hussein in 1974, the point 
of Kirkuk became the new sticking point.107  The oil-rich city of Kirkuk was obviously not 
something that Baghdad could be willing to give up.  Kirkuk was neither within the KDP’s area 
of control, nor were most inhabitants Kurdish.108  Baghdad expressed a willingness to concede 
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several other territorial disputes and an portion of Kirkuk’s oil revenue, but not political control 
of the city, and Barzani pulled out of the negotiations.   It is difficult to believe that Barzani 
genuinely wanted an agreement that would cede control to Baghdad given his demanding of the 
impossible.  He may well have been happy with the situation he was in, wherein he was the most 
influential leader in Kurdistan and Baghdad couldn’t quite exert its authority over him.  It was 
widely suspected that Mulla Mustafa Barzani didn’t actually want an agreement, and this 
suspicion was reaffirmed quite publicly by the defection of his son, Ubayd Allah Barzani, who 
defected to the National Front after his father rejected the Autonomy law of 1974. 109 
While the Barzani family’s long history of leadership in the Kurdish region makes it the 
easiest target, Jalal Talabani and the Peoples’ Union of Kurdistan cannot be totally exempted 
from criticism. By 1980, the failure of negotiations and Hussein’s reprisals against Barzani and 
his allies had caused the PUK to control most of Iraqi Kurdistan.  Talabani’s PUK entered into 
negotiations with Baghdad and announced a ceasefire.  By this time, the Kurds’ position versus 
the Iraqi government and Hussein’s position generally had both declined.  It was still impossible 
for Hussein to give up Kirkuk’s oil wealth, but Talabani still insisted on it.  In a position of 
power, the PUK was just as willing to maintain their direct control under a condition of 
unofficial autonomy as the KDP was a few years earlier.  The negotiations eventually petered 
out, culminating in Talabani’s brother being killed by pro-government Kurds in 1983 and the 
arrival of U.S. aid in Iraq.  Baghdad’s moment of weakness had passed, and both Kurdish parties 
had chosen to maintain their personal strength at the expense of a sustainable legal 
arrangement.110  
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During the same period just reviewed, the clashing Kurdish groups also played the border 
between different power centers.  In the 20th century world, these power centers were not as 
clearly placed on opposing sides of the Kurdish mountains as they had been in the Ottoman-
Safavid struggle; Israel, the United States, and the USSR were key players just as much as Iraq, 
Iran, and Turkey were.  The principle, however, is the same as it was in previous conflicts.  The 
Kurds attempted to use their position on the periphery to either sidle up to or antagonize one 
power or another.   
Perhaps the clearest example of Kurdish groups playing the border is the efforts of the 
KDP and the PUK to negotiate with both Iran and Iraq during the war between those countries.  
During Mulla Mustafa Barzani’s negotiations with Saddam Hussein, he made sure to maintain an 
open line of communication with Tehran.  This infuriated Hussein, who had opened the 
negotiations with what he saw as a number of good-faith gestures towards the Kurds.111  From 
the perspective of an outsider, Saddam’s outrage seems almost reasonable; he was engaged in a 
war with Iran, and people he saw as his own citizens were participating in talks with the enemy 
capital, even after the principle of Iraqi unity had been tentatively agreed upon.  But considering 
Barzani’s perspective makes some of the reasons for this classic Kurdish strategy visible.  
Without the constant threat of switching to the Iranian side, Barzani could not hope to take on 
Baghdad.  In fact, a reading of the last few hundred years of Iraqi history would show that no 
group of Kurds has really ever been sufficiently powerful to singlehandedly take on the 
governments in Istanbul, Baghdad, or Tehran.112  Idris Barzani offered to cut ties with Iran in 
exchange for a binding agreement on Kurdish autonomy, but he would only accept one in which 
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the Kurdish autonomous region was so large and powerful that the calculus just described would 
no longer apply.  Indeed, the Barzanis proved to be correct about his need for the Iranian 
connection.  After the failure of his negotiations with Baghdad, Barzani was able to turn (albeit 
briefly) to Tehran for material support in his preparations for war with Hussein.113   
While different Kurdish groups certainly maneuvered versus Baghdad and Tehran in the 
conflicts of the late twentieth century, they also maintained their position in the political 
borderlands at each other’s expense.  For the majority of the conflict, each gained influence and 
security at the expense of the other.  As Mulla Mustafa Barzani’s bargaining position became 
weaker towards the end of his negotiations with Saddam, Saddam took advantage of the situation 
by turning to Talabani’s PUK as an alternative.  Talabani was all too happy to step into that role.  
To demonstrate his faction’s potency and potential value to Baghdad, Talabani ordered attacks 
on the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), Kurdish Socialist Party (KSP), and tribal Kurdish militias.  
It is quite a condemnation of Talabani’s commitment to his rhetoric of socialism and Kurdish 
unity that, of the three groups he targeted in making his example, two were explicitly Kurdish, 
and two shared the PUK’s leftist orientation.114  The PUK grew closer still to Baghdad and 
positioned itself as the new representative of the Kurdish people in the weeks immediately 
following Hussein’s public parading and execution of 8,000 members of Barzani’s clan.  (The 
event would later come to be seen as a harbinger of the genocide to come.)115  
For their part, the state powers with whom the Kurds interacted during these conflicts were 
eager to drive wedges between Kurdish factions.  While this initially seems like a potential 
reason besides tribal behavior for the inter-Kurd fighting described above, the ease with which 
various governments were able to use one Kurdish faction against another is ultimately a 
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statement in favor of the idea that a tribal pattern was still followed by the PUK and KDP.  As 
was referenced previously, the Ba’ath government was able on several occasions to make peace 
or align itself with one Kurdish faction with the aim of weakening or excluding another.  As 
early as 1968, Baghdad successfully brought Talabani’s faction of the KDP into its orbit by 
offering the opportunity to represent the Kurds’ interests to Baghdad.  Talabani’s faction was 
theoretically still a part of Barzani’s party at the time, but his struggle for influence against 
Barzani was a significant enough difference that Baghdad could cleave them apart, leaving both  
sides weaker.116  This split would eventually become the basis for the formation of separate 
parties.   
The Iraqi, Iranian, and Turkish governments both succeeded in using each other’s Kurds as 
leverage against each other during conflict, and at cooperating to suppress Kurdish movements 
during peacetime.  During their war, both countries supported Kurdish groups within the borders 
of the other in attacking targets of value to the state.  Iran armed the KDP semi-regularly 
throughout its conflicts with Iraq and allowed Kurdish groups to retreat into Iran when they 
needed to.117  Iraq, on the other hand, used Kurdish tribal militias as a part of its defense of the 
north against Iranian aggression.118  Iraq and Iran eventually reached agreement on the Kurdish 
issue, which led to the KDP’s supplies being cut off just as it was preparing for war with Iran.119  
When faced with a violent campaign by the PKK, Turkey obtained permission from Baghdad to 
attack Kurdish groups in the north of Iraq.120   
If there is one aspect of the Kurdish parties’ conduct which is perfectly fits the model of 
segmentary or “balanced” opposition and tribal conflict generally, it is the nature of the events 
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which eventually led to peace between the Iraqi Kurds finally being established.  As was 
mentioned, in 1980 Saddam Hussein marched 8,000 male members of Barzani’s clan through the 
streets of Baghdad to their execution.  Some were as young as thirteen.121  In 1983, pro-Iraqi 
militias killed Talabani’s brother and two nieces.122Soon after, the PUK’s talks with Baghdad 
broke down, and the Iraqi military began razing villages, leaving 55,000 people homeless and 
many dead.  In September of that year 500 children between 10 and 14 were rounded up in 
Sulaymania, tortured, and killed.  In May 1987, the Kurdistan Front formed consisting of the 
KDP, PUK, and other smaller groups including the Kurdish Socialist Party, Kurdish Peoples’ 
Democratic Party, Pasok (a leftist group), The Toilers’ Party, the Iraqi Communist Party in 
Kurdistan, and the Assyrian Democratic Movement.  Forces were merged and a joint command 
was established.123   
This sudden unity was found in two ways.  For the first time, the outside challenge to the 
Kurds was a total and existential threat.  After all, what followed these events was a systematic 
genocide of the Kurdish people.  With the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to think that this fear 
would have been the only motivation due to the terrible events which followed.  But another 
element must be considered: honor.  The conflicts between Iraq and the Kurdish groups had 
previously followed the acceptable patterns of tribal conflict outlined earlier: raids were 
conducted, leaders killed, and so forth.  Also importantly, Hussein had generally gotten Kurds to 
kill other Kurds rather than attacking Kurdistan himself, except during the 1974-75 war, which 
the Kurds clearly started.124  The mass killings carried out by Hussein leading up to the 
establishment of a united Kurdish front were different.  They constituted a blood debt that 
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Saddam could never peaceably repay, and it was owed to all of Kurdistan, not just one faction.  
The Iraqi tayfe under Saddam had attacked the Kurdish tayfe, and that was a challenge that had 




Conclusions: A Tribal Way Forward? 
The recent history of the Kurdish political parties demonstrates the fragmentation that has, 
alongside other factors, long prevented a cohesive Kurdish state from forming.  But a closer 
analysis will show that it displayed something else: a new version of the segmentary tribe 
described by Bruinessen and a new type of balanced opposition described by Salzman.  The 
different political parties proved to be a highly effective form of social organization, which 
rapidly came to influence large swaths of Kurdish society.  Geographically, the Kurdish region 
was covered by a mosaic of influential parties which would eventually coalesce into the KDP 
and PUK blocs which now characterize Kurdish society.  More important than their geographic 
inclusiveness, though, is the tribes’ ability to incorporate different parts of society.  The parties’ 
varying ideologies of independence, democracy, socialism, and resistance brought in the 
younger, more urban, more educated parts of Kurdish society.  Jalal Talabani and Aero Ahmad, 
modern urban political elites by anyone’s sense of the word, were particularly successful in this 
role. The Barzanis, on the other hand, used the KDP and the desire by tribal leaders to stay 
relevant, to incorporate tribes in rural areas. 
The story told in the latter part of the last chapter was one of conflict, but it is eventually 
also the story of the formation of a pluralistic state institution within which formerly violent 
enemies come to compete in the political realm.  Through quite a lot of turmoil and various 
pressures, that fledgling state has now remained peaceful and secure for over a decade.  The 
parties themselves can be criticized for being undemocratic, but the same cannot really be said 
for the KRG, which has now experienced three successful election cycles.  The parties’ merger 
of their armed forces to combat Saddam Hussein turned out to be relatively permanent; each 
major party now maintains counter-terrorism brigades but the Peshmerga answers to the KRG.  
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The state in question no longer has Iraqi or American troops patrolling its roads and has survived 
intact something that cannot really be said for the Iraqi state as a whole.  The Kurdish state in 
northern Iraq is rapidly approaching de facto independence by nature of its sovereignty over the 
use of force in its borders, its independent international stance, and its growing economic 
viability. By all accounts, it appears that the parties of the KRG, despite their hatred for each 
other, have opted to participate in what is beginning to look like a successful state rather than 
resort to their old patterns of violence. 
Unity in Kurdistan was initially achieved, as is argued in Chapter 2, by the presentation of 
a threat and insult on such a scale that Kurdistan’s segmentary society reacted as a whole tribe.  
According to Salzman’s theory of balanced opposition, this unity might only be expected to last 
as long as the existential threat that created it.   For several reasons, this appears not to be the 
case.  Firstly, let us call to mind the example of the Jaf tribe as observed by Rich and Edmonds 
between 1820 and 1920.  The Jaf coalition grew large as the Jaf needed to fight a war.  But the 
tribe did not immediately wane in size; it took serious misfortune on the part of the Jaf’s leading 
lineage for that to happen.  This is a less-than-resounding endorsement for the future of the 
Kurdish state in Iraq.  This predicts not a stable state, but a weak entity which holds together 
only as long as there is a Saddam Hussein or an ISIS surging up the steppe to fend off.  It can be 
said that the KRG persisted for a few years in between the end of American military presence 
and the beginning of the war with ISIS, but that is hardly a ringing endorsement of the state’s 
future.   
In justifying my assertion that the Kurdish state will persist, it is necessary to return to 
some other theories discussed in Chapter 1, specifically those of Judith Yaphe and Faleh Abu 
Jabar.  Yaphe proposed that as the state exerts its influence over a tribal population, the tribes 
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fundamentally change.  They take on one of several forms which are more cooperative with the 
state than their nomadic tribal predecessors were.  What can be seen in the modern KRG is 
exactly this.   As the Barzani tribe and its allies rose to what is essentially neo-tribal paramountcy 
in the KRG, Barzani and the KDP began speaking as leaders of a state, which that Abu Jabar 
identifies as evidence of a statist tribe.  With this rhetoric came a reality that tribes in Kurdistan 
are now subject to: state authority over judicial matters.  Political parties have taken on the role 
of mobilizing large blocs in balanced opposition to one another, but they have no mechanism 
with which to replace the role of the tribe as mediator-in-chief; only state institutions can do that.  
As the state has strengthened, tribes have given up another crucial role by ceasing to maintain 
independent militaries.  Thus a new image of the tribe in the state is formed, in which tribes 
maintain their spiritual and social characters, are part of permanent supra-tribes as far as political 
mobilization, and part of a state which fulfills the judicial and defense roles that the tribes and 
parties are no longer able to fulfill.   
If this suggestion for the future of Iraqi Kurdistan holds true, its significance is much 
farther reaching.  If a modern pluralist state can successfully incorporate tribal structures and 
attitudes in this manner, then this may represent a new path for other parts of the Middle East.  
Only a few aspects of this event are unique to Kurdistan.  The first and most unique is the 
presence of a true external existential threat to convince warring factions to combine.  While this 
could exist for other Middle Eastern nations, it is not a desirable situation to replicate.  The 
second element is that the combat between factions in Iraqi Kurdistan retained a certain tribal 
civility alongside its tribal brutality; the fighting was often fierce, but rarely involved the 
wholesale destruction of fighting forces.  If these and the other conditions that led to unity in 





Abu Jabar, Faleh, "The Reconstruction and Deconstruction of Iraq's Tribes: Tribalism under 
Patrimonial Totalitarianism, 1968-1998," unpublished paper, October 14, 1999. 
Al-Jubburi, Shaikh Mish'an. Interview by Helga Graham. The Independent, August 20, 1995. 
Al-Jumhuriyya, 21 September 1991, in FBIS-NES, 26 September 1991, 21-23. 
Baram, Amatzia. "Neo-Tribalism in Iraq: Saddam Hussein's Tribal Policies 1991–96." 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 29, no. 01 (1997): 1-31. Accessed February 5, 
2015. doi:10.1017/S0020743800064138. 
Culture and Information Bureau, The Arab Baath Socialist Party. "A Call to the Heroic Tribes in 
Southern Iraq." Al-Moharer. September 7, 2006. Accessed April 15, 2015. http://www.al-
moharer.net/qiwa_shabiya/baath2006/baath7-9-06e.htm. 
"Definition." Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. Accessed March 12, 2015. 
http://www.pukpb.org/en/penase.  
Dukhan, Haiah. "Tribes and Tribalism in the Syrian Uprising." Syria Studies 6, no. 2 (2014): 1-
28. 
Edmonds, C. J. Kurds, Turks, and Arabs. London, NY: Oxford University Press, 1957.  
"Iraq: Economy." The World Factbook. Accessed February 25, 2015.   
https://www.cia.gov/llibrary/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html.  
Evans-Pritchard, E. E. The Nuer, a Description of the Modes of Livelihood and Political 
Institutions of a Nilotic People. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1940. 
Hussein, Saddam. "Speech to the Ba'ath Regional Congress." Speech, 1992 Ba'ath Regional 
Congress, Baghdad, October 7, 1992. 
Ibn Khaldoun, Abd Al-Rahman Ibn Mohammad, Abd a Rahmand Bin Mahmoud. The 
Muqaddimah. Translated by Franz Rosenthal. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967. 
Izady, Mehrdad R. The Kurds: A Concise Handbook. Washington: Crane Russak, 1992.  
KurdMedia. "Bloodline Instead of Merit: The Talabanis." IndyBay (blog), January 10, 2007. 
http://www.indybay.org/newsitems/2007/01/10/18345489.php.  
Marr, Phebe. The Modern History of Iraq. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1985. 
McDowall, David. A Modern History of the Kurds. London: I.B. Tauris, 1996. 
"THE MAIN KURDISH POLITICAL PARTIES IN IRAN, IRAQ, SYRIA, AND TURKEY: A 









Rich, Claudius James. Narrative of a Residence in Koordistan. Farnborough, England: Gregg, 
1972.  
Rifai, Amb. Omar. Comments to CIEE Arab Diplomacy Class. Amman, Jordan. Spring 2014. 
Rubin, Michael. "Kurdistan’s ‘$265 Million’ National Security Council: Nepotism Not Good 




Rudolph, W. (1959), 'Einige hypothetische Ausfuhrungen zur Kultur der Kurden', Sociologus 9: 
150-162. Cited in Van Bruinessen, Agha.... 
 
Salzman, Philip C. "The Middle East's Tribal DNA." Middle East Quarterly 15, no. 1 (Winter 
2008): 23. Academic OneFile. 
 
Shakely, Farhad. "The Naqshbandi Shaikhs of Hawraman and The Heritage of Khalidiyya-
Mujaddidiyya in Kurdistan." The International Journal of Kurdish Studies 19 (2005): 119-35.  
Sykes, Mark. "The Kurdish Tribes of the Ottoman Empire." The Journal of the Royal 
Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland 38, no. July-Dec (1908): 451-86. 
Accessed February 5, 2015. JSTOR. 
Van Bruinessen, Mrtin. "The Kurds between Iran and Iraq." Middle East Report, no. 141 
(July/August 1986): 14-27. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3011925.  
Visser, Reidar. "Opinion: Tribalism in Iraq: Resurgent Force or Anachronism in the Modern 
State?" Contemporary Arab Affairs 3, no. 4 (2010): 495-502. 
doi:10.1080/17550912.2010.519162. 
Yaphe, Judith. "Tribalism in Iraq, the Old and the New." Middle East Policy 7, no. 3 (2000): 51-
58. Accessed February 8, 2015. doi:10.1111/j.1475-4967.2000.tb00162.x. 
Yeğen, Mesut. "Turkish Nationalism and the Kurdish Question." Ethnic and Racial Studies 30, 
no. 1 (November 23, 2006): 119-51. doi:10.1080/01419870601006603.  
Yom, Sean L. "Jordan: The Ruse of Reform." Journal of Democracy 24.3 (2013): 127-39. 
Project Muse. Web. 
